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ABSTRACT 
This project delivers an immediately implementable and replicable method for improving 
collaboration in this nation’s most complex interagency environment, the United States 
embassy (USEMB). This method allows multidisciplinary teams to create a self-
organizing collaborative system in the country team to address difficult problems within 
the constraints of exiting manning, authorities, and appropriations. The modular and 
scalable methodology described in this project allows Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
teams working in embassies around the world to maximize their operational effectiveness 
by improving collaboration within the country team. 
The goal of this project is to move beyond policy debates regarding interagency 
collaboration and explain how SOF are capable of pioneering a responsive system to 
improve collaboration within the USEMB country team. Applying a design thinking 
methodology, we observed country team interactions and other interagency collaborative 
efforts to develop a concept for SOF augmentation teams to improve collaboration within 
the USEMB country team. We deliver guidelines and a methodology for SOF 
augmentation teams to facilitate the development of a collaborative country team capable 
of solving complex issues.  
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The whole-of-government approach is absolutely crucial to getting after 
[threats to the U.S. and our partners].… We’ve got to work together to 
make sure that those threats don’t end up on our shores.  
—Admiral William McRaven, 2013 
 
A whole-of-government approach to problem solving requires interagency 
collaboration. However, realizing a sufficient level of interagency collaboration is a 
challenge. Miscommunication and cultural misunderstanding can create obstacles to 
collaboration among agencies. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, a shared goal 
can emerge that overcomes these barriers and focuses the efforts of various USG 
agencies. For instance, following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the al-Qaeda 
Network (AQN) Executive Order (EXORD) granted extensive authorities to the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to execute global operations against terror networks 
associated with al-Qaeda (Malvesti, 2010, p. 3). This charter established Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) at the core of the interagency counterterrorism arena. However, 
as perceptions regarding the ability of al-Qaeda to threaten the United States (U.S.) 
homeland diminished, the debate regarding how the USG should approach national 
threats recommenced.  
U.S. embassy country teams are the interagency organizations at the forefront of 
U.S. government (USG) policy. It is at the country team that USG agencies and 
organizations have the greatest opportunity to synchronize policy development and 
implementation. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) remains 
advantageously positioned to maintain the fight against terrorist groups (Joint Special 
Operations University, 2011, pp. 45–6). However, SOF cannot succeed in this fight 
alone. There is a considerable need for guidance regarding how to integrate SOF with 
other agencies and organizations represented at USEMB to solve the complex problems a 
country team encounters.  
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The specific goal of this project is to assist SOF teams in integrating into the 
complex environment of a USEMB country team. This project offers SOF leaders an 
immediately implementable, scalable approach to establishing a mutually beneficial 
culture of collaboration in an interagency environment. It provides three guidelines for 
SOF leaders seeking to facilitate a collaborative problem solving within the country team: 
understand the country team and its context, educate and prepare SOF augmentation 
teams, and introduce design thinking to the country team. We highlight design thinking 
because we believe it offers an immediately implementable, practical, experiential 
approach to problem solving in complex situations by capitalizing on the collective 
expertise, knowledge, and insight of a multidisciplinary network. 
The following narrative provides some context regarding the challenges a SOF 
augmentation team leader faces working as part of a country team. 
A. NARRATIVE: SOF ASSIGNMENT TO COUNTRY TEAM 
Imagine you recently returned from an operational deployment to discover your 
command selected you to fill a recently vacated team leader position supporting a 
counterterrorist mission in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Knowing the 
circumstances do not allow a formal handover with the previous team leader, you 
immediately contact the current assistant team leader for a brief run down on the team’s 
recent operations. The assistant team leader does not seem knowledgeable of the team’s 
mission or the previous team leader’s activities. In a seemingly vain attempt, you ask for 
the team’s turnover file. The assistant team leader provides an arbitrary mixture of reports 
and a convoluted list of interagency and partner nation personalities in the country and 
region.  
You recognize this information is wholly inadequate and seek additional 
information on the local environment, various regional threats, and friendly forces in the 
area. Citing other, more pressing requirements, the staff is unable to provide much more 
information than what you already learned from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
World Fact Book. Frustratingly, the other unit members with experience in the country 
are all deployed, or on leave, and not due back until after your scheduled departure. You 
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realize you must find your own information. You start your search using the USSOCOM 
Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) database. The data available is 
sparse, and you have no luck finding contact information for the knowledge manager for 
that region. You resign yourself to learning about the situation when he gets on the 
ground. 
You arrive in country to find the team dispersed across multiple locations, 
disorganized, and poorly informed of the situation. Without the previous team leader to 
conduct formal introductions at the embassy, you decide to head to the embassy and 
introduce yourself to the country team and other senior officials. The usual dog sniffing 
contests begins as soon as you enter the chancery. You immediately notice a high level of 
compartmentalization within the embassy and little obvious connection to the host nation 
partner force the team is there to advise and assist. As you introduce yourself and listen to 
your new colleagues, you hear the usual litany of complaints regarding draconian budget 
cuts and understaffing that seem to be prevalent throughout each of your previous 
assignments.  
The first embassy counterterrorism (CT) synchronization meeting covers an 
extensive list of foreign fighters and possible connections to the U.S. homeland. Seated 
by rank and informal cliques, various analysts and interagency representatives fill an 
uncomfortable room as the lead agency’s operations director takes charge. The majority 
of the attendees say nothing. Those who do, provide very little information pertinent to 
immediate or emerging threats. The meeting ends and everyone hastily disperses. You 
attempt to speak with various representatives before they depart to verify their 
understanding of your mission. You learn that few care, and few of those who do truly 
understand it. Already frustrated with your first 48 hours of interaction, you email your 
command in an attempt to clarify your vague “go forth and conquer” mission statement. 
Clarity comes intermittently through a series of seemingly contradictory emails from 
various members of the staff. 
Eventually, you get the opportunity to discuss your mission with both the Chief of 
Mission (COM) and Chief of Station (COS) in a closed-door meeting. Tempted to 
produce a slideshow, you instead choose to commit your talking points to memory. 
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Before approaching the Ambassador, you meet with the COS and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) in-country representative because it is the Ambassador’s policy. 
You recognize your mission indirectly affects and benefits them both, and everyone 
agrees to support each other’s mission.  
When you brief the COM, you notice cues that the Ambassador is hesitant to 
support your mission. You learn an ongoing U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) project is occurring in the area you are seeking to expand your advisory and 
assistance mission. The USAID representative expresses concern that increased U.S. 
military presence in the area will trigger an uprising. You seek support from the COS, but 
quickly realize he experiences similar concerns often and is electing to back down. 
Dejected, you collect your notes and head back to your tiny embassy space (really just a 
glorified closet) to call your headquarters on the secure line before typing up your formal 
situation report (SITREP). You update your command on your progress only to have your 
boss berate you for your “lack of salesmanship.” Frustrated, you hang up the phone and 
ask yourself “What do I do now?” You head back to your team house to consider your 
next move. 
B. THE CONTEXT: SOF AND THE COUNTRY TEAM 
As the United States reduces the presence of military forces in declared theaters 
of active armed conflict (DTAAC), SOF will continue to counter threats to U.S. national 
interests around the globe. Countering national and regional threats originating from 
places, such as Yemen, the Republic of the Philippines, the Trans-Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa, will require an approach different from those developed and utilized by the 
United States to address the unique challenges of designated combat zones. SOF leaders 
must accept and adapt to this changing state of affairs by building upon existing 
knowledge, skills, and competencies to support the USEMB teams already living and 
operating in these varied and contentious environments. 
SOF do not possess the manning, authorities, or appropriations to cope 
unilaterally with the complexity of many emergent challenges unilaterally. As the 
complexity of the problems increases, the ability of SOF leaders to collaborate with the 
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other elements of the USG will grow in importance. Admiral McRaven (2012) addresses 
this paradigm shift in his USSOCOM 2020 Strategy. He emphasizes, “[The SOCOM] 
vision is a globally networked force of Special Operations Forces, interagency, Allies and 
Partners able to rapidly and persistently address regional contingencies and threats to 
stability” (p. 2). A practical impetus for this shift does exist. SOF cannot expect the 
support of large, co-located joint operations centers (JOC), such as those frequently seen 
in the DTAAC. Outside the DTAAC, the USEMB country team supersedes the JOC as 
the front line command post.  
Richard Lugar, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
stresses, “There is no country in the world where our Nation can afford to send diplomats 
and serviceman ill-prepared to understand and make the tough choices” (U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 2006, p. v). Embassies are on the frontline for 
executing U.S. interests, which demands the best from its Ambassadors, Foreign Service 
officers, and all the individuals assigned from within the interagency. Due to the influx of 
interagency and DOD personnel into USEMBs worldwide, a growing need exists to 
ensure they are all working together to contribute to the U.S.’s foreign policy goals in 
each respective country (p. 1). Thus, the question becomes, how is the country team at 
each USEMB collaborating to work towards the U.S.’s policy goals? Most importantly, 
how might SOF facilitate collaboration within the country team? 
C. THE CHALLENGE: TRANSITIONING THE COUNTRY TEAM FROM 
COORDINATION TO COLLABORATION 
A country team may appear as a microcosm of the larger interagency community, 
but is actually an organization with an established hierarchy putting the ambassador in 
charge of all of the various interagency organization representatives within the country 
team. A complex issue develops when individuals from a host of organizations, familiar 
with the bureaucratic world of interagency coordination within the national capital region 
(NCR), find themselves a member of the USEMB country team with its own unique 
authority structure. This issue defines the challenge of this project. Working as a member 
of the country team requires a mental shift from coordination to collaboration for the 
individuals assigned to work at an USEMB. 
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Coordination, to begin with, describes the concept or mechanism for interaction 
between organizations. De Coning (2002) defines coordination as a “system of 
interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual 
support, and planning at all levels between organizations to achieve respective 
objectives.” DOD Joint Publication 3–0 defines interagency coordination as “the 
coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged 
U.S. agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective” (Department of 
Defense, 2012, p. GL–10). This complex process allows the USG to combine and analyze 
multiple facets of a particular national issue to provide decision makers with the best-
informed interagency assessment.  
Collaboration is the process of two or more entities working together to 
accomplish a shared objective. Roberts and Bradley (1991) define collaboration as “a 
temporal social arrangement in which two or more social actors work together toward a 
singular common end requiring the transmutation of materials, ideas and/or social 
relations to achieve that end” (p. 212). In a similar view, Straus (2002) defines 
collaborative problem solving as “the process people employ when working together in a 
group, organization, or community to plan, create, solve problems and make decisions” 
(p. 18). Within the country team, collaboration means individuals from various 
interagency organizations join forces to share information, integrate efforts, and pool 
resources to provide solutions and options for the ambassador.  
Collaboration cannot occur in isolation. It requires two or more actors connected 
in some way. The type and extent of connections between actors is a prerequisite for the 
emergence of collaboration. However, complex systems of internal and external 
influences affect collaboration differently. Not all relationships support collaboration to 
the same extent. Some can result in indiscriminate relational connections that may inhibit 
group collaboration if the broker restricts the flow of resources and information. 
Ultimately, the collaborative capacity of a group of people emerges from the strength and 
number of relational ties. Their collaborative capacity, also known as social capital, is a 
function of the relational ties that bind the network together. As Cohen and Prusak (2001) 
explain, social capital is “the stock of active connections among people; the trust, mutual 
 6 
understanding and shared values and behaviors that bind the members of human networks 
and communities and make cooperative action possible” (p. 4).  
The existing country team structure offers numerous opportunities for individuals 
and agencies to communicate and coordinate with each other. Many might assume that 
these efforts are truly collaborative. However, country team collaboration requires more 
than just communication and coordination. Collaboration within the country team 
requires its various members to work together towards common objectives and end-
states, all which revolve round providing options for the ambassador’s diplomatic 
mission and objectives. 
The fundamental issue is not one of legislated authorities. The challenge is how to 
improve trust and understanding between agencies within the country team using existing 
structures to strengthen relationships. Admiral McRaven (2012) succinctly states in 
USSOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear, “Success in the future demands 
unprecedented levels of trust, confidence and understanding—conditions that cannot be 
surged” (p. 3). If the country team is the platform in which gaining and leveraging this 
trust is to occur, then a great deal of focus is necessary to prepare individuals to work in 
this environment. This begins by developing a better understanding of the challenges and 
approaches to collaboration.  
How a USEMB country team collaborates is a largely undefinable process. If 
individuals treat the country team like a microcosm of the broader interagency 
community, they will never fully embrace the collaborative spirit required within a 
country team because their allegiance will remain to their parent organization. Country 
team members must accept their role as part of an organization, willing to put the country 
team’s objectives ahead of their own agencies, which is difficult if the country team lacks 
an established identity. Although interagency professionals will agree that effective 
methods of problem solving require the collaboration of various agencies, they admit that 
dealing with other agencies is challenging.  
Every country team is unique and may structure itself differently. Although these 
interagency environments continually change, and organizational cultures evolve as 
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personalities come and go, one constant remains, the need to transition from the NCR 
interagency network of independent autonomous agencies to the country team 
organization. To the extent that budgets shrink and personnel systems constrain talent to 
specific organizations, the way in which country teams work together on complex issues 
will become increasingly essential to future success. Therefore, we address an important 
question: how can SOF help the country team transition in this complex and dynamic 
environment that requires collaboration as a key component in its problem-solving 
process? 
D. BARRIERS TO COUNTRY TEAM COLLABORATION 
In A Diagnostic Approach to Building Collaborative Capacity in an Interagency 
Context, Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen (2006) present a systems model of inter-
organizational collaborative capacity. Using this model, they identify several barriers and 
enablers to organizational collaboration. The five barriers to collaboration are (1) 
divergent purpose and strategy—conflicting goals and lack of shared purpose inhibit 
effective collaboration, (2) structural—specific prohibitions, or cultural norms, against 
information sharing undermine collaboration, (3) lateral mechanisms—a lack of 
familiarity with other organizations promotes distrust and enmity that inhibits 
communication, (4) incentives—organizational territoriality and competition for scarce 
resources incentivize individuals not to collaborate, (5) people—individual perceptions 
can lead to arrogance, disrespect and outright hostility between individuals of various 
organizations (p. 8). Any approach to interagency problem solving must overcome 
barriers to collaboration and identify opportunities for various agencies to complement 
the efforts of others. 
The county team problem-solving and decision-making process is an interrelated 
system of constraints and opportunities influenced by numerous stakeholders. The issues 
and challenges that the country team faces—possibly to include disaster response, host 
nation security or election reforms, or pursuit of U.S. national interests—benefit from a 
unified government approach. No single organization has all the answers to these types of 
problems. Similar to the checks and balances involved in USG creation of law, the 
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interagency acts as a system of checks and balances to itself to ensure all interests and 
concerns for a given issue are considered. For the country team to function, decision 
makers and agency stakeholders must have a sufficient level of individual credibility and 
trust in other members.  
However, eight challenges impede collaboration among the agencies that 
comprise the country team. 
1. Stovepiping 
Stovepiping is a common phenomenon in centralized bureaucratic institutions due 
to the restricted flow of information from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy. The 
consequence is that only the top of the hierarchy can integrate information passed only 
through vertical channels. The intelligence community is often accused of stovepiping 
because of the strict handling of the various types of collection, which keeps it in “stove-
piped” channels. Even after the 9/11 Commission report, which lambasted both law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies for not sharing information regarding the growth, 
radical plans. and infiltration of extremist Al Qaeda cells into the United States, 
information is still retained internally to organizations and often only shared informally 
between analysts (Lamb & Marks, 2009, p. 10). 
For the country team, stovepiping can be extremely damaging to its effectiveness. 
Integrated efforts become devalued because representatives within the country team may 
be tempted to hold onto and treat certain types of information as special to their parent 
organization and keep it “stove piped” internally through that organization’s own 
channels. Although the ambassador has hierarchical authority over the country team, he 
might not see all communications of the country team with other organizations and 
agencies. For example, the DOD and FBI, when submitting reports to their headquarters, 
use unique, classified IT systems that Department of State (DoS) systems cannot access. 
The underlying effect at a typical country team meeting might be an incomplete 
presentation of information or a half-hearted attempt by the presenting organization to 
share information. When the country team does not share information, collaboration is 
very difficult.  
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2. Lack of Cultural Understanding 
Organizations often spend a great deal of effort to prepare personnel to master 
their assigned specialty within their parent organization, but do not emphasize preparing 
these same personnel for their role within a country team. For instance, various units 
within USSOCOM assess, select and train personnel to influence many types of people to 
accomplish the mission. Despite this selection process, and training, some SOF personnel 
are more capable developing and maintaining interagency and country team partnerships. 
However, even talented operators are ineffective without sufficient cultural 
understanding. 
SOF cannot effectively integrate into country team problem solving efforts if we 
fail to understand other organizational cultures. Understanding the values and 
backgrounds of other organizations allows SOF to build on common goals and identify 
areas to improve interagency problem solving and decision making. Most importantly, 
cultural sensitivity will lead to improved creativity within the embassy. The DOD has a 
reputation for boasting an “everyone should be like me” mentality. SOF personnel must 
address this concept with their colleagues by demonstrating genuine empathy and an 
ability to listen and collaborate. 
Although the DOD and the DoS have different charters, they both support 
overarching national policy objectives with the intent of secure this nation’s strategic 
position. In the seminal classic, Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus, Army Colonel 
Rickey Rife (1998) states, “Once we understand the differences in our two agencies 
(DOD and DoS) we are well on the way to using them to our advantage —capitalizing on 
our respective strengths and special skills” (p. 2). As he suggests, successful interagency 
collaboration requires that SOF leaders understand cultural differences and turn them into 
positive attributes. The DoS mission is to keep this nation from going to war through 
diplomacy, while the DOD’s mandate is to fight and win this nation’s wars. If SOF fails 
to understand the role of the DoS, then it is unlikely effective collaboration will occur. He 
stresses, “the various members of the Country Team bring to the mission their own 
respective organizational cultures, procedures, expectations, situational awareness and 
levels of expertise. This again has a strong tendency toward ‘stove piping’ of the effort, 
 10 
with individual Country Team members frequently remaining within their comfort zones 
by exchanging information with and responding to direction from their leadership back in 
the U.S.” (p. 2-1). 
3. Competition 
Competing interests often exist between organizations. Loyalties to the 
organizations or self-interests supersede any other common purpose unless that common 
purpose is severe (e.g., an embassy attack). Budget cuts and resourcing shortfalls 
typically play into an organization’s ability to contribute to a common purpose. Yet, 
while a logical call for a network amidst the interagency does occur, within the USG, 
each agency is beholden to the finite limited purse of the Congressional Budget Office. 
Since the USG budget process has yet to adapt to this interagency collaborative network, 
each agency must continue to fight for its piece of the budget pie, again leading to 
competition within a resource (money) constrained environment. These shortfalls are not 
always negative as they may cause organizations to pool resources together. More often 
than not, however, these restraints cause tension and competition. Organizations may also 
perceive friction stemming from the manner in which executive and legislative channels 
grant authorities. The DOD’s broad authorities to execute operations in support of 
national security are often perceived as encroaching upon, or in direct competition with, 
the authorities granted to other organizations. Whether this is due to a lack of education 
or experiences, competitive misperceptions affect country team interaction, trust, and 
information sharing. Once participants within the country team recognize that they are in 
competition or conflict, it becomes much harder to collaborate.  
4. Lack of Communication 
Communications techniques culturally acceptable within one agency can cause 
significant consternation within other agencies. Representatives of some agencies prefer 
to present and receive information in the form of a typed memorandum or to host a 
meeting with handwritten notes. Often, the country team will host meetings with no 
formal agenda or briefing slides. DOD leaders, on the other hand, often use PowerPoint 
slides to represent all forms of data. Any attempts to change cultural norms makes some 
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military leaders appear overbearing and can lead directly to friction among agency 
members.  
Unfortunately, too frequently, DOD leaders attempt to communicate with 
interagency partners in a directive manner befitting a superior speaking to a subordinate 
rather than as peers. DoS Foreign Service officers and other career government civilians 
neither welcome nor accept this style of interaction. Furthermore, the flippant use of 
DOD jargon in an interagency setting can be the difference in the success or failure of 
strategic DOD objectives. These seemingly inconsequential cultural differences make 
SOF leaders often appear overbearing to their interagency counterparts.  
5. Individual and Organizational Conceptual Blocks  
In Conceptual Blockbusting, Adams (2001) explains that numerous conceptual 
blocks influence the problem-solving process. Adams explains that a failure to recognize 
the influence of conceptual blocks frequently prevents the problem solver from 
accurately perceiving a problem or determining an appropriate solution (p. 13). Personal 
biases, cognitive limitations, cultural norms, and group dynamics interact to influence 
how problem solvers approach problems of all types. In particular, these conceptual 
blocks impede the discovery of innovative methods and approaches for coping with 
wicked problems, such as the vicious cycle the interagency endures when trying to 
collaborate on culturally divisive and competitive issues (see Figure 1). Each 
organization (labeled O1, O2, O3, and O4) intersects with only part of the problem, and 
the organizations lack any kind of a collaborative relationship. Biases naturally occur 
when an organization only sees one angle or position of the problem. In spite of these 
biases, the rationale for organizations to collaborate is to solve problems not constrained 
by the boundaries of one organization. Since the problem is bigger than any organization, 
collaborating with other organizations is necessary if progress is to be made in effectively 
managing the problem. If the problem represented in Figure 1 is terrorism, then the 
organizations (O1–4) could easily represent the FBI, the CIA, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Security Administration (NSA) (Raab & 
Milward, 2003, p. 414).  
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Figure 1.  Rationale for collaboration (from Milward & Provan, 2006, p. 9)  
Numerous conceptual blocks directly affect interagency problem solving and 
decision making. Improving the interagency problem-solving process requires addressing 
conceptual blocks, which Adams (2001) says are “imposed by our immediate social and 
physical environment” (p. 71). For example, embassy workspaces are often hectic. 
Problem solving is difficult when phone calls, urgent email and unexpected visitors 
interrupt. There are numerous ways to mitigate these distractions so colleagues can 
discuss a particular problem with minimal interruption. One approach is to leave the 
disruptive environment. This can be as simple as taking colleagues out for coffee or 
hosting a working luncheon at a restaurant outside of the embassy. This allows the 
colleagues to discuss a particular problem with less distraction, but also build a more 
personal relationship with each other.  
6. Lack of Defined Purpose and Performance Metrics 
The country team’s mission may be tough to define and fully understand due to 
politics and nuance of diplomacy. Add to it the demands of the individual organizations 
that comprise the country team, and its purpose becomes more complex and dynamic. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that individuals within the country team 
might have difficulties understanding the purpose of the country team. Moreover, country 
team members have strong tendencies to delimit the problem territory poorly and 
characterize problems within the confines of prevailing perceptions of roles and 
responsibilities. Habits developed through training and specialization strongly influence 
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how one perceives purpose and frames the problem set, which can lead to false or 
unnecessary limitations (Adams, 2001, p. 120). Without an agreement on purpose, 
determining a common metric of success is problematic for any country team. While the 
metrics for success are most apparent when a crisis is at hand, they are less so, when 
faced with ambiguous challenges, i.e., economic stability or security cooperation, 
especially when U.S. national interests are not immediately at stake. In these matters, 
collaboration is critical to define a collective end-state and measure its results, especially 
they are not readily apparent. 
7. Systemic Inflexibility 
Another challenge facing the country team is its inability to adapt to the rising 
networked modes of coordination among new security threats from both state and non-
state actors across the globe (Raab & Milward, 2003, p. 4). The dark networks1 that 
define contemporary security threats, such as transnational terrorism, global crime, and 
weapons proliferation, are not only able to coordinate the resources and actions of 
globally linked criminal actors, but are particularly suited for evading national security 
efforts traditionally focused on superpower conflicts and relations (Krahman, 2005, p. 
19). To respond effectively to these security challenges and dark networks, the national 
and international security providers, i.e., U.S. interagency and country teams must 
employ adaptable networks. This shift towards networked modes of collaboration has 
forced the restructuring of government agencies to form formal and informal links like 
the U.S. militaries’ “network-centric warfare,” which uses information technology to link 
multiple military units and agencies with increasing speed and synchronization 
(Krahman, 2005, p. 20). To operate in the networked world, the USEMB country should 
be an example of a collaborative network, one that works as a whole to advance USEMB 
goals and objectives. Unfortunately, country teams are often not flexible enough to adapt 
to the dynamic problems and environment they face. The challenge is getting individual 
agencies, steeped in static bureaucratically oriented processes, to adapt and communicate 
in such a fluid network.  
1 Dark networks are hidden (i.e., covert or clandestine) networks (Everton, 2012, p. 399). 
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8. Lack of Trust 
Each of the challenges previously listed, when unchecked, leads to an overall lack 
of trust and hurts any attempt at collaboration with the country team. Figure 1 shows how 
organizations intersect only part of a given problem and are subject the constraints of a 
given policy/budget, begging the questions, how are agencies able to trust in such a 
constrained and competitive environment? And if agencies cannot trust one another, how 
can the individuals of a country team learn to trust given that they represent and must 
maintain some loyalty to their parent organization? 
Other institutional issues also contribute to mistrust. A new SOF officer coming 
into a country may have difficulty trying to establish buy-in from the country team on a 
given mission tasking. The rate of personnel turnover may have a profound impact on 
how he does his job. Other organizations that stay in country for long periods know that 
they can “wait out the new guy,” and withhold information, or simply ignore the officer’s 
existence due to a perceived lack of experience, which could lead to further distrust. The 
level of trust will ultimately undermine the collective approach to problem solving. 
E. IMPROVING COUNTRY TEAM COLLABORATION WITH DESIGN 
THINKING 
Ryan (2012) examines contemporary approaches to interagency collaboration and 
problem solving to identify ways to improve interagency interaction (i.e., scenario-based 
planning, the interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF), the strategic multilayer 
assessment (SMA) and the interagency management system (IMS) (p. 23). He concludes 
that a failure to address steady state planning exists amongst agencies that forces 
individual organizations to rely on incongruent operational planning techniques. 
Furthermore, Ryan (2012) assesses that crisis-centric or reactive planning approaches 
unrealistically assume that participants can rationally overcome various organizational 
and cultural contexts to obtain consensus regarding the nature of the problem before 
collectively arriving at an acceptable solution (p. 25). Thus, his goal is to develop a new 
framework to overcome the challenges of interagency collaboration, one that is “inclusive 
of diverse perspectives, integrative of the contributions of individual agencies, flexible to 
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the scale and range of interagency challenges, [and] robust against power dynamics” (p. 
23). With these inclusive, integrative and flexible criteria in mind, Ryan calls for 
interagency leaders to develop and adopt a new approach to steady state interagency 
coordination.  
Ryan (2012) reasons that the traditional cross-cultural nature of design “can 
enable innovative strategy development and organizational learning” (p. 28). He 
enumerates five characteristics of design that make it uniquely suitable for interagency 
collaboration. (1) Design is “meta-perspective” (p. 27), which allows design to transcend 
disparate organizational perspectives and experiences to analyze the system in which the 
problem resides. (2) Design emphasizes “egalitarian discourse” (p. 27). According to 
Ryan (2012), “Designs discursive structure facilitates holistic understanding, in contrast 
to traditional, rational, decision-making approaches that decompose problems into 
functional areas” (p. 27). Design trades the perceived efficiency of a highly structured 
problem-solving approach for a discourse intended to foster a holistic understanding of 
the problem to avoid negative distal effects. (3) Design is “robust to power differences 
among team members.” (p. 27). The general process of design prevents unquestioned 
frames of reference by challenging existing assumptions, definitions, and boundaries for 
inquiry (p. 28) that can reduce the formation of coalitions counterproductive to creative 
thinking (p. 21). (4) Design is “loosely structured and iterative” (p. 28). The lack of rigid 
checklists or products keeps the process flexible and scalable to remain within time and 
resource constraints (p. 28). (5) Design “does not rely on military-specific concepts” (p. 
28), which reduces animosity inherent with a military dominated planning methodology 
and improves the acceptance of the process by other agencies.  
Ryan (2012) is a clear advocate of a design approach to interagency collaboration. 
His research indicates that a design approach to complex situations can facilitate 
consensus when various individual incentives and biases threaten to undermine the 
decision-making process (p. 28). Ryan’s broad assessment of contemporary efforts to 
promote organizational collaboration leads to his conclusion that designing is a useful 
tool that complements traditional methods of interagency activity.  
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Roberts (2011) also advances design thinking for collaborative problem solving, 
especially as the number of stakeholders and complexity of problems increase (p. 53). 
She describes the design thinking approach as a, “collaborative problem solving process 
that invites people who ‘live’ with the problem to frame it, establishes the parameters and 
constraints of the solution search, identifies creative ideas as solutions, rapidly prototypes 
and tests solutions in the field, collects feedback and reframes problems and solutions 
wherever the data-driven process (not ideology) leads” (p. 21).  
The authors concur. Throughout their engagement over the past 12 months with 
various Stanford d.School fellows, and two of the IDEO design consulting firm partners 
(David Blakely and Dave Haygood), they discovered that design thinking provides a 
neutral and intuitive process that promotes collaboration to address complex problems 
effectively. SOF augmentation teams, trained and experienced in facilitating the design 
thinking process, can immediately improve interagency collaboration within the existing 
manning, appropriations, and authorities of a USEMB country team. 
F. CAPSTONE STRUCTURE 
The following chapters outline the design thinking approach to problem solving. 
Chapter II conducts a literature review of the design thinking process, which breaks down 
the phases and roles of personnel using design thinking. This chapter also discusses the 
genesis of design thinking and how the Stanford Design School and the innovation 
consultancy IDEO revolutionized the business world.  
Chapter III details our use of the design thinking process address the challenge of 
this project. This chapter also describes how we used the discover, ideation and prototype 
phases to complete this capstone project. It also provides context for using design 
thinking with military application. The chapter ends with useful details for properly 
implementing design thinking as part of a SOF augmentation team operating in an 
embassy.  
Chapter IV describes the country team and the embassy environment. It assists 
SOF leaders in understanding how they fit into the overall embassy construct.  
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Chapter V explores the nuances of introducing design thinking to the other 
interagency members of the country team. It highlights the importance of capitalizing on 
the right opportunities to add value to the COM’s mission objectives.  
Chapter VI examines how to prepare SOF augmentation teams prior to deploying 
to such a complex and dynamic environment as an USEMB. This nation’s SOF leaders 
have been adept at preparing for combat for the past 12 years, but the embassy 
environment provides new challenges for which SOF leaders must prepare.  
Finally, Chapter VII concludes the project, distills lessons learned and provides 
recommendations for further study on the use of design thinking by SOF to cope with 
complex problems.  
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II. DESIGN THINKING 
Design thinking is a holistic, optimistic, and inclusive human-centered approach 
to collaborative problem solving. Popularized by product designers and architects, design 
thinking evolved from an industrial process to create innovative products to a process that 
addresses challenging social issues in highly complex and ill-defined environments. 
Design thinking integrates multidisciplinary teams to discover inspiration from 
prospective users and relies on prototypes (i.e., tangible representations of a product or 
process) for users to test prior to implementation. It is a powerful methodological 
approach suitable for immediate implementation by those who seek to overcome 
environmental resistance to collaboration within country teams. 
Although design thinking is a highly useful approach to coping with dynamic and 
wicked problems in the interagency or country team environment, it is not a suitable 
approach to all problems. It augments, rather than replaces, current problem-solving 
approaches. Time sensitive and stressful situations (e.g., crisis response) require other 
methods of problem solving (e.g., military decision making process—MDMP). Design 
thinking is a process to cope with complex human problems, such as multidisciplinary 
network problem solving and inter-organizational collaboration. It provides stakeholders 
with a neutral space to develop a shared understanding of the problem, as well as 
desirable, feasible and viable approaches to resolution.  
This chapter describes the design thinking process as one practical approach to 
collaborative problem solving. It is not a manifesto on design.2 We begin with a 
discussion of the purpose and characteristics of three interrelated processes (discover, 
ideate and prototype) that comprise the iterative design thinking process. A description of 
the critical roles (initiator, sponsor, convener, design team and stakeholders) and 
elements (the design brief, the design team and the design space) necessary for the design 
thinking process follows.  
2 For a detailed treatise on the theory of design, consult The Design Way by Nelson and Stolterman. 
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A. THE DESIGN THINKING APPROACH 
[Design thinking] is an approach to innovation that is powerful, effective 
and broadly accessible … [that] teams can use to generate breakthrough 
ideas. (Brown, 2009, p. 3) 
The design thinking approach can appear as unstructured chaos to individuals 
comfortable with linear, reductionist problem solving. Brown (2009) explains that this 
viewpoint “is not because design thinkers are disorganized or undisciplined but that 
design thinking is fundamentally an exploratory process” (p. 17). Brown (2008) explains 
that the design thinking process is a “system of spaces rather than a predefined series of 
orderly steps” (p. 4). His explanation emphasizes that design thinkers are free to move 
through the design thinking process as necessary rather than bound to move linearly from 
step to step.  
In common usage, design is not always interchangeable with design thinking. The 
Design Council (2013), the advisory organization on design to the United Kingdom (UK) 
government, defines design as “an activity that translates an idea into a blueprint for 
something useful, whether it’s a car, a building, a graphic, a service or a process.” Design 
thinking, in contrast, is more a mindset. Krieger (2010) explains design thinking as “an 
approach to solving… problems by understanding users’ needs and developing insights to 
solve those needs” (p. 7). More than a discrete blueprint for problem solving, design 
thinking represents a worldview, individual mentality and method of establishing a 
collaborative and creative culture.  
Influential design thinking advocates use different terms to describe the iterative 
aspect of design thinking. IDEO describes design thinking a cyclical process of 
inspiration, ideation and implementation. The Stanford Hasso Plattner Institute of Design 
(d.school) designates design thinking as a system of five connected phases: empathize, 
define, ideate, prototype and test (d.school, 2013, p. 1). Acumen (2013) outlines the 
design thinking process as an iterative transition between discovery, ideation and 
prototyping. Regardless of the terminology used to identify the various spaces or modes 
of design thinking, it is an iterative, cyclical process. The design team occupies the 
interrelated spaces of the design thinking process as necessary. 
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This project combines these analogous perspectives and codifies the design 
thinking process as three interrelated core phases: discovery, ideation and prototyping 
(see Figure 2).3  
 
Figure 2.  The design thinking approach 
1. Discover 
It ain’t so much the things we don’t know that gets us into trouble. It’s the 
things we know that just ain’t so. 
—Josh Billings (Keyes, 2006, p. 3) 
 
Discovery within the design thinking process melds traditional research 
techniques with qualitative assessments to develop empathy and define the problem. It is 
an active and participatory process of learning about a problem and its contextual 
environment. Essential in determining constraints and challenging assumptions (Brown, 
2009, p. 237), discovery involves a deliberate effort to overcome the numerous 
conceptual blocks that may hinder the problem solver’s ability to understand a problem 
within its context.  
Thus, the purpose of the discovery phase is to obtain information relevant to the 
problem territory, develop deeper empathy with stakeholders, and delimit the problem 
3 Although presented as a linear sequence, design thinking is non-linear in execution. 
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space (d.school, 2013, p. 2). It is an important method of deriving inspiration from 
sources outside a particular organization or group. Within the discovery phase, design 
thinkers empathize with stakeholders and users to define the problem territory. The goal 
is to unmask latent needs, which the user may be unaware, and share insights among the 
design team (Thoring & Müller, 2011, p, 38). To achieve this end, discovery is a 
continual process of observation, insight and empathy.  
a. Observation 
Disassociated numerical data cannot replace the value of personal experience in 
the contextual environment of the problem territory. A critical component of determining 
how individuals behave in particular context is the observation of prospective users, 
which involves more than directly asking people about their wants and needs (Kelley & 
Kelley, 2013, p. 90). Surveys alone are insufficient at informing the design thinking 
process. Surveys are great tools for validation, but true insight requires fieldwork (D. 
Haygood, personal communication, November 26, 2013). How people say they act and 
their actual behavior often differ. Anthropological tools and contextual observations 
allow for a better understanding of the problem territory than quantitative analysis of 
measured data. For this reason, experiential learning is the heart of the discovery phase 
(d.school, 2013, p. 2). Observing the ways people adapt to their environment often leads 
to the identification of existing, successful workarounds. Watching people interacting 
with a product or within a social system provides understanding of what they truly value. 
Thus, knowledge of human behavior and individual experience in a particular 
environment provides insight into what the design thinking team must address in 
prototypes (Davis & Tedesco, 2013).  
Ultimately, effective observation requires suspension of judgment. Kelley and 
Kelley (2013) recognize this suspension is particularly difficult for individuals who 
consider themselves experts in a particular field. However, they stress the importance of 
setting aside preconceived notions to see what is true (p. 90) to allow the design team to 
determine what users and stakeholders actually value within a system. Observation leads 
to insights that inform the rest of the design thinking process.  
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b. Insight 
Insight is the process of synthesizing observation and experience. It is the creative 
act of identifying meaning from raw information (Brown, 2009, p. 70). Insight often 
requires repeatedly asking the question “why” to determine the root causes of systemic 
challenges. Asking a minimum of five “why” questions is an approach to the deep 
analysis of causal relationships (Andersen & Fagerhaug, 2006, p. 17). Asking “why” 
challenges prevailing assumptions and improves comprehension of the problem territory.  
The visualization of complex systems or large amounts of observed data is an 
important source of insight. Visual analytical tools reduce the cognitive work necessary 
to process and analyze large amounts of data to gain insight through perception and 
interaction (Keim, Mansmann, Schneidewind, & Ziegler, 2006). Visualization can 
facilitate insight by organizing and grouping information to facilitate the examination and 
structuring of the information the design team gathered. It allows the design team to 
understand observations within a larger context. Furthermore, visualization can assist in 
illuminating gaps in knowledge and the need for additional observational data.  
Many analytical techniques are useful for deriving insights from observational 
data. One technique particularly valuable in deriving insight from the information 
gathered during the discovery phase is social network analysis (SNA). SNA plays a 
crucial `role in defining human-centered problems influenced by the structural factors of 
a system or network. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the relational 
interactions between actors (Freeman, 2004, p. 16) and provides empirical content 
regarding its social context (Everton, 2012, p. 7). Most importantly, it can pinpoint how 
relevant actors can adapt to their environment by changing the nature of their ties and 
relationships.  
c. Empathy 
Any successful solution to a social problem is born from empathic understanding. 
The ability of the design team to understand a problem from the perspective of a user can 
only come from observation, engagement and immersion (d.school, 2013, p. 1). Krieger 
(2010) stresses that “only through contact, observation and empathy with end-users can 
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you hope to design solutions that fit into their environment” (p. 9). Empathy is the 
conceptual foundation of the design thinking process.  
Empathy is a contested term. Numerous definitions appear in the literature. In the 
context of design thinking, empathy is the ability to see the world from another person’s 
perspective. Its intent is to understand the interrelated motivations, core beliefs and 
contextual factors that influence behavior (Kelley & Kelley, 2013, p. 20). It is not 
unquestioned agreement or trite platitudes mindlessly offered to another individual so 
that they view people, or their organization, in a positive light. Empathy is a form of 
awareness born from a deep understanding of individual needs and environmental 
context.  
Design thinking’s emphasis on holistic observation to develop empathy opens up 
ideas for desirable innovation. It allows the design team to identify stakeholder values 
and preferences. Ultimately, the understanding that comes from ethnographic 
observation, contextual insight, and user empathy informs the ideation process. 
2. Ideate 
Defer judgment.        Encourage 
wild ideas.        Stay focused on the 
topic.        Build on the ideas of others.  
—Sign in IDEO design space 
 
Ideation is the translation of insights into ideas (Brown, 2009, p. 64). It is the 
process of generating and developing ideas to prototype (p. 16). Ideas materialize from 
the insights obtained during the discovery phase coupled with the knowledge and 
experience of the design team. The goal of ideation is to generate as many distinguishable 
ideas as possible. The greater the number of ideas produced, the greater the probability 
that at least one innovative idea will surface. 
Divergent thinking produces the largest number of unique ideas and critical to 
ideation. The degree to which a design team is interdisciplinary correlates to the group’s 
ability to generate an array of different ideas during brainstorming. The design thinking 
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facilitator plays a crucial role in encouraging divergent thinking and helping the design 
team build on the ideas of one another.  
Group brainstorming sessions can generate large numbers of ideas. Group 
brainstorming provides a structure for sharing ideas (Brown, 2009, p. 86). In addition to 
generating ideas, properly facilitated group brainstorming sessions produce five positive 
outcomes for organizations: (1) improve organizational memory, (2) develop participant 
skills, (3) evaluate knowledge by challenging assumptions, (4) reward technical skill with 
status and (5) impress observers (Sutton & Hargadon, 1996, p. 685). Brainstorming also 
reinforces behaviors and practices associated with a culture of creativity that produces 
organizational benefits outside the confines of formal brainstorming sessions (Sutton & 
Hargadon, 1996, p. 715).  
Visualization also helps translate abstract notions into tangible ideas and 
communicate vague concepts to a diverse group. It is a valuable method of avoiding the 
semantic confusion that can emerge from the use of acronyms, jargon, slang, and 
colloquialisms among a diverse set of stakeholders. Dry erase whiteboards and Post-it 
notes are valuable tools for visualizing ideas in a manner that invites feedback and 
potentially lead to new ideas or improved understanding. Post-it notes also facilitate the 
rearrangement and clustering of ideas to reveal prevailing themes and insights. 
At the culmination of the ideation phase, the design team synthesizes information 
to select and idea for prototyping. While divergent thinking is impetrative in generating 
new ideas, convergent thinking is important to the transition from ideation to prototyping. 
Convergent thinking is necessary when a group selects among existing options (Brown, 
2009, p. 67). Limited material resources and time require design teams to select only a 






Fail early to succeed sooner.  
—IDEO motto (Brown, 2009, p. 17) 
 
Prototyping is the phase of the design thinking process that moves concepts that 
emerged during the ideation phase into reality through exploration, testing and refinement 
(d.school, 2013, p. 4). A prototype translates a promising conceptual idea into something 
tangible others can evaluate and test. Prototypes bridge the gap between the abstract and 
the practical. Useful prototypes range from physical products to dramatizations of a 
process. The essential quality of a useful prototype is that users can interact with it and 
provide feedback. According to Brown (2009), “by taking time to prototype our ideas, we 
avoid costly mistakes such as becoming too complex too early and sticking with a weak 
idea for too long” (p. 105). Frequent prototyping prevents the design team from 
overinvesting in an unsuitable course of action. 
The purpose of prototyping is twofold. First, prototyping tests assumptions and 
validates solutions. Every prototype represents progress (Brown, 2009, p. 65). 
Prototyping early and often provides crucial feedback and encourages further innovation. 
Second, prototyping provides the design team with an important opportunity for 
experiential learning that supports subsequent iterations of the design cycle. Prototyping 
then informs discovery and ideation during subsequent iterations of the design thinking 
process. Bill Burnett refers to prototyping as a way of building your way to a solution. He 
describes prototyping as the process of making in order to think (Stanford Center for 
Professional Development, 2011). Effective prototypes provide answers to specific 
questions and validate ideas (Acumen, 2013). The results from prototyping can improve 
empathy with prospective stakeholders, improve the definition of the problem, and 
provide experiential knowledge that can lead to new ideas.  
Prototyping is a necessary phase of the design thinking process because all 
potential solutions have associated costs. Rapid and frequent prototyping assists in 
identifying the potential costs of an idea early in the design thinking process. Brown 
 26 
(2009) recommends that prototypes “command only as much time, effort and investment 
as is necessary to generate useful feedback and drive an idea forward.” (p. 91) Perfection 
is the enemy of a good prototype. Frequent prototyping allows the design team to 
evaluate ideas without large initial investments of time or money (d.school, 2013, p. 4). 
Krieger is also a staunch advocate of early and rapid prototyping to obtain valuable 
feedback during the design process. According to Krieger (2010), when “users look at a 
[lo-fidelity] prototype [they] see potential; [when] they look at a [hi-fidelity] prototype 
[they] see problems” (p. 70). Therefore, obtaining user feedback early and often in the 
process via a series of lo-fidelity prototypes is indispensable to the design process.  
Prototypes may range from low fidelity (e.g., cartoons doodled on a napkin) to 
high fidelity (e.g., detailed, full-scale physical mock-ups). Low-fidelity prototypes focus 
on conceptually representing an idea to aid in answering questions resulting from 
idealized concepts (Vianna, Vianna, Adler, Lucena, & Russo, 2012, p. 123). Low-fidelity 
prototypes represent low investments in time and resources and are often most valuable 
in obtaining initial feedback from users. People are ordinarily less likely to share candid 
opinions regarding a prototype if they perceive the design team is highly invested in any 
one idea (Acumen, 2013). Additionally, low-fidelity prototypes encourage participants to 
build on the ideas the design team presents (Acumen, 2013). High-fidelity prototypes are 
detailed representations that approximate how the ultimate design will actually function 
(Vianna et al., 2012, p. 124). Each level of fidelity allows the design team to evaluate the 
prototype with potential users and stakeholders, and obtain feedback. A useful prototype 
is something potential users and stakeholders can interact with to provide valuable 
feedback.  
Prototyping social processes or an interaction in a manner that facilitates testing 
and user feedback is challenging. Narratives, role-playing, and storyboards mapping out 
the structure or process of an idea can be useful. Narratives tell a descriptive story of the 
design team’s idea from the future. Role-playing allows potential users and stakeholders 
to simulate their role as they participate in a process or experience. Storyboards, or 
process mapping, allow users to visualize a particular process or experience (Acumen, 
2013). Each method has value in evaluating certain aspects of a particular design. 
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Combing methods improves the feedback obtained on multiple attributes of the potential 
design. It is up to the design team to determine how best to represent a non-tangible 
process in a manner that elicits the most meaningful feedback and insight.  
• Testing 
Testing is a critical aspect of prototyping. Without testing, the design thinking 
process breaks down. A prototype without testing is an art project. The difference 
between an idea and a prototype is that a prototype is testable. Testing involves putting 
the prototype in front of stakeholders and potential users to learn from their reactions. 
The surest test of a prototype is not an internal review within the confines of a controlled 
environment, but out in the world where its intended users can experience it (Brown, 
2009, p. 231). Every test provides insight that informs the design thinking process. 
Ideally, prototyping leads to new discoveries, new discoveries will lead to novel ideas, 
and new ideas will morph into new prototypes that require additional testing. Every test 
of a prototype improves understanding of the problem territory and knowledge of what 
approaches are feasible. To facilitate meaningful feedback from testing, it is important 
that stakeholders and potential users have a prototype with which they can interact.  
The value of prototyping extends beyond user feedback. It avoids costly 
investments of time and resources in designs users will neither accept nor implement. 
Frequent prototyping also teaches vital skills of improvisation and creativity that nourish 
the design thinking process. Prototyping sustains a bias toward action and encourages 
continued improvement regardless of outcome. 
B. THE DESIGN THINKING SYSTEM 
Iterative discovery, ideation, and prototyping are only part of the larger design 
thinking process. These phases are part of a larger system that begins with an idea and 
ends with the user acceptance (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3.  Design thinking process 
The design thinking process does not begin spontaneously. Deliberate effort is 
necessary to set the conditions for the productive application of the design thinking 
process to a particular challenge and implement the result. The following sections 
describe each step in detail. 
C. INITIATING THE DESIGN THINKING PROCESS 
Initiation of the design thinking process begins with a determination of whether 
design thinking is suitable to the problem at hand. Design thinking is not a universally 
appropriate method of problem solving. It is a systematic methodology to facilitate 
innovative problem solving. At times, linear thinking is indispensable, and at other times, 
a linear approach creates more problems than it resolves. Linear methods of problem 
solving are suitable for resolving “simple” (Type I) problems, are correspondingly not 
suited for “complex” (Type II) problems and are often inadequate for “wicked” (Type III) 
problems (Roberts, 2000, p. 2). A design thinking approach to problem solving is best 
suited to coping with ill-defined problems when incremental change is insufficient.  
1. Key Roles 
Design thinking requires leadership to sustain the innovation process. The process 
and techniques of design thinking will appear very familiar to transformational leaders 
regardless of profession or field. Although, design thinking provides a framework for 
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leaders to establish a culture of creativity in their organization leaders must match 
thinkers with doers. It is up to leaders to mobilize their organizations for action in 
resource-constrained environments (Nelson & Stolterman, 2012, p. 5).  
The design thinking process consists of five key roles: initiator, sponsor, 
convener/facilitator, design team, and relevant stakeholders.  
• Initiator. The initiator is the individual who commences the design 
thinking process. When initiators identify a significant need or issue they 
are facing, they naturally evaluate what problem solving approach is most 
suitable and will most likely produce the best results. If the initiators lack 
sufficient resources or legitimacy to commence the design thinking 
process, they must identify a sponsor. 
• Sponsor/Convener. The sponsor/convener plays a critical role in the 
design thinking process. The sponsor/convener provides purpose, 
direction, and resources to the design team. Most importantly, the 
sponsor/convener provides the legitimacy and resources necessary to 
encourage people to act (Kenty, Gosline, & Reitman, 2010, p. 16). The 
experience and judgment of the sponsor/convener is essential in 
determining whether the design thinking process is a suitable approach to 
coping with an issue, or whether an alternative problem solving method is 
more appropriate. When the sponsor determines that coping with an issue 
warrants a design thinking approach, the sponsor then provides the 
resources to support the design thinking process.  
• Facilitator. The facilitator guides the collaborative process under the 
supervision of the sponsor (Kenty et al., 2010, p. 16). The facilitator is the 
most important role in initiating and sustaining the design thinking process 
to an implementable result. The facilitator consolidates resources and 
curates information to support the design team’s innovation process. The 
role of the facilitator is particularly important during synthesis and 
interpretation to the extent the design team lacks experience with the 
ideation phase of design thinking process.  
The facilitator may be a member of the core design team, or an impartial 
organizer trusted by the sponsor to manage the design thinking process. 
However, in situations in which the convener lacks sufficient experience 
with the design thinking process, an independent facilitator may advise 
and assist the convener as necessary during the design thinking process.  
• Core Design Team. The core design team includes personnel trained and 
experienced in facilitating the design thinking process. The core design 
team is responsible for establishing a design space, executing the 
collaborative design thinking process, and providing feedback to the 
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sponsor (see section II.D.1, The Design Team, for a more thorough 
discussion of the composition and recommended characteristics of the 
design team.).  
• Stakeholders and potential users. Inclusion of stakeholders and potential 
users is indispensable to the implementation of the results of the design 
thinking process. A stakeholder is any individual or entity that must make, 
or can block a decision necessary for successful implementation of the 
results of the design thinking process. The number of potential 
stakeholders is often undeterminable for ill-defined social problems 
characteristic of Type III, wicked problems. For the purposes of eventual 
implementation of the results of the design thinking innovation, it is useful 
to consider proximately relevant stakeholders.  
Relevant stakeholders fall into at least one of three categories: someone who must 
make a decision to support the implementation of a prototype, someone who can block a 
decision mandatory for implementation, or someone directly affected by the proposed 
innovative change (Roberts, 2013). The degree of stakeholder involvement in the design 
thinking process correlates to the ultimate success of the problem-solving effort. The 
stakeholders will ultimately implement the best prototype that emerges from the design 
thinking process. Early and frequent inclusion of relevant stakeholders in the design 
thinking process reduces stakeholder resistance to innovative change. 
2. The Design Brief 
If I had an hour to solve a problem and my life depended on the solution, I 
would spend the first fifty-five minutes determining the proper question to 
ask, for once I know the proper question; I could solve the problem in less 
than five minutes. 
—Albert Einstein (Seelig, 2012, p. 19) 
 
The sponsor develops a design brief as a tool to initiate the design thinking 
process by providing purpose and direction to the facilitator and design team. Brown 
(2009) describes the brief as “a set of mental constraints that gives the project team a 
framework from which to begin, benchmarks by which they can measure progress and a 
set of objectives to be realized” (p. 22). Unique constraints, benchmarks, and objectives 
influence every design challenge. Knowledge of these dynamics informs the rest of the 
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design thinking process. Therefore, a good design brief consists of four components: the 
design challenge, constraints, benchmarks, and objectives.  
a. The Design Challenge 
A natural starting point for any effective problem solving approach is to frame the 
design challenge properly. A design challenge is a significant question that guides the 
design thinking process. It codifies the goal of the design team. Traditional problem 
statements presume a correct solution already exists and solving a particular problem is 
only a matter of implementing that solution (Kelley & Kelley, 2013, p. 99). A design 
challenge does not presume a solution exists. 
A suitable design challenge is both significant (i.e., worth solving) and feasible 
(D. Blakely, personal communication, November 26, 2013). A significant and feasible 
design challenge comes from properly describing the problem space. A good design 
challenge often begins with a verb or is expressible as a “how might we” question (IDEO, 
2009, p. 35). A “how might we” question makes insights actionable and is an invitation 
for input and guide for exploration (Acumen, 2013). This question becomes the design 
challenge. Developing a suitable and feasible design challenge is an essential first step 
toward the attainment of project objectives.  
b. Constraints 
All practical problem-solving approaches occur within a constrained environment. 
Design thinking is no different. All design projects have constraints of time, resources, 
and motivation. These constraints are dynamic. Additional constraints may emerge 
during the design thinking while certain contextual changes may eliminate others. As the 
design team improves understanding of the problem territory it provides feedback that 
allows the sponsor/convener to refine the design challenge. This assists in avoiding 
overinvestment in flawed ideas. Clear acknowledgement and acceptance of constraints is 
foundational to the design thinking process (Brown, 2009, p. 18). Knowledge of 
constraints grounds design thinking in the practical.  
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Constraints are interrelated. Ignoring this fact, and isolating one constraint from 
others, in an attempt to reduce the complexity of a particular problem, leads to an 
inherently flawed result. Kelley and Kelley (2013) explain that every innovation must 
balance three interrelated factors: feasibility, viability, and desirability (p. 19). Feasibility 
refers to the capacity of relevant stakeholders to implement a potential innovation (i.e., Is 
a potential innovation technologically possible?). Viability pertains to the practicality of a 
potential innovation (i.e., Is a potential innovation sustainable?). Desirability 
encompasses human factors associated with innovation (i.e., Do people want 
innovation?). A prototype that does not properly balance feasibility, viability, and 
desirability, or reside within the constraints of a project, is inherently defective.  
 
Figure 4.  Factors of design innovation (from Kelley & Kelley, 2013, p. 19) 
c. Benchmarks 
Benchmarks are useful in keeping a design challenge on track to meet a deadline. 
They create opportunities to review progress and make mid-course corrections as 
necessary (Brown, 2009, p. 21). Benchmarks also are useful in providing feedback to the 
design project sponsor and stakeholders and opportunities for the facilitator and design 
team to reassess that the design project properly balances feasibility, viability, and 
desirability (p. 25). Moreover, benchmarks measure small-scale accomplishments vital to 
sustaining a culture of creativity essential to the larger design thinking process. 
Demonstrated small-scale accomplishment leads to larger success (D. Blakely, personal 
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communication, November 26, 2013). Furthermore, periodically reviewing the 
accomplishments of the design team can reinvigorate the design thinking process.  
d. Objectives 
A clear objective keeps the design thinking process focused and maintains the 
design thinking process as an active problem solving approach focusing on developing 
the possible. According to Nelson and Stolterman (2012), “designing is the means by 
which desired ends become real.” (p. 239). They explain, “Unlike scientific schemas, 
which represent true things, design schemas are used to form particular representations or 
aspects of ideal things out of a cloud of possibilities, in support of a divergent or 
expansive process of inquiry” (p. 7). Design thinking is about synthesizing information to 
create a new whole. A clear objective focuses the efforts of the design team. 
D. DESIGN COMPONENTS 
In addition to the aforementioned design brief, the design thinking process 
requires two other elemental inputs, a design team and a design space.  
1. The Design Team 
The design thinking process is a participatory problem-solving approach most 
effective when utilizing multidisciplinary groups. It is about building on the ideas of 
others to explore a multitude of possible solutions and produce prototypes (Davis & 
Tedesco, 2013). The heart of the design process is the design team. Without a team, the 
complexity of problems can quickly overwhelm the individual working in isolation. For 
this reason, the formation of a team is essential to the design thinking process. 
The design team consists of two notable elements, a core team of two to three 
individuals with knowledge and deep expertise facilitating the design thinking process, 
and a larger multidisciplinary network of diverse, yet complimentary, members to 
address the design challenge. Experts, from different disciplines, who combine their 
unique perspectives and skills, have a higher probability of developing innovative 
solutions to problems than an individual working alone (Thoring & Müller, 2011, p. 38). 
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Thus, multidisciplinary teams uncover unique insights, make unexpected discoveries, and 
generate more new ideas.  
Process without expertise is ineffective (D. Blakely, personal communication, 
November 26, 2013). During the course of thousands of design challenges, IDEO 
determined a design team functions best when formed around a core element of three to 
eight individuals, one of whom has experience facilitating the process (IDEO, 2009, p. 
13). This core element is vital to guiding the larger interdisciplinary network to 
successful innovation. The first responsibility of this core element is to foster a culture of 
inclusiveness that encourages new members to participate in the design challenge, and 
then to guide the development of a larger problem-solving network. Consequently, this 
core element must have expertise in facilitating the design thinking process, as well talent 
for building and sustaining social relationships.  
In navigating the larger problem-solving network through the design thinking 
process, the first task of the design team is to identify appropriate constraints, objectives, 
and benchmarks for the design challenge (Brown, 2009, p. 13). This approach allows the 
design team to define the problem territory and develop an appropriate design challenge. 
The design team then sets off to produce a prototype that meets the defined objectives 
within the time and resource constraints of its contextual environment.  
The skills and abilities of a successful design team correspond to those of an 
effective brainstorming team. Sufficient conditions for effective brainstorming sessions 
include participants with (1) task interdependence, (2) established or burgeoning social 
relationships with other participants, (3) a personal investment in a successful outcome to 
the process, (4) pertinent technical expertise, (5) skills that compliment other participants, 
and (6) expertise in the process (Sutton & Hargadon, 1996, p. 688). The design team that 
possesses these skills is most likely to succeed in creating an implementable prototype 
that addresses the objectives of the design challenge. 
The larger interdisciplinary network, on the other hand, leverages a mix of strong 
and weak ties. The strength of ties refers to the number and type of discrete connections 
between any two entities. Actors within cohesive subgroups have strong ties with other 
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members, while those actors in loosely affiliated networks predominately have weak ties 
with one another (Everton, 2012, p. 138). Strong social network ties equate to close 
friendships while weak connections refer to acquaintances. Weak ties provide important 
connections to outside groups. Granovetter (1983) demonstrated weak ties are more 
effective at connecting members of discrete groups than strong ties.  
Collaborative network resilience is important to the long-term success of the 
project. The number and proportion of strong and weak ties significantly influences the 
resiliency of a network (Newman & Dale, 2005). Resiliency is largely a function of 
individual trust in other participants and optimism that the design thinking process will 
succeed. Brown stresses the importance of trust to the design thinking process by 
asserting, “Optimism requires confidence, and confidence is built on trust” (Brown, 2009, 
p. 77).  
The relationships that sustain a design-thinking network require time and frequent 
face-to-face interaction. Having people present in the same location is fundamental to 
creating relationships, sharing information, brainstorming, and prototyping. 
Consequently, the design team needs a space. 
2. The Design Space 
  
Figure 5.  Stanford Hasso Plattner Institute of Design (d.school) design space  
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The design space is a repository for information, a venue for ideation, and a 
location to develop prototypes. It is a physical space in which participants can come 
together and interact in a collaborative way. Virtual spaces are excellent methods for 
managing information but can create barriers to the design thinking process. Although 
virtual space has use in the ideation process, especially when potential users and 
stakeholders cannot travel to be in the same physical location, the actual work of the 
design thinking process must occur in a physical environment in which the design team 
can interact with each other with the fewest number of barriers between them. 
Design space facilitates inspiration and assists the design team in focusing on the 
design challenge by creating an immersive and innovative environment (IDEO, 2009, p. 
13). This environment has a profound influence on behavior and is a powerful tool to 
inspire collaboration (Doorley & Witthoft, 2012, p. 5). Often, the benefits of a dedicated 
design space can spread beyond the confines of the designated space.  
The design space is a workspace, not a showcase (p. 7). It is a space for the design 
team to prototype and experiment with Whiteboard sketches, and collections of post-it 
notes, record ideas and communicate insights visually to other members of the design 
team and support continual progression (see Figure 5). Eventually ideas cover the walls 
and items collected from the field clutter the space. This eclectic assortment of material 
and thoughts nurtures a culture of experimentation and creativity. Without a dedicated 
design space, it is difficult for the design team to concentrate fully on the design 
challenge. 
A design space is never finished. The design team should not accept a design 
space as a given condition (Doorley & Witthoft, 2012, p. 5). It must adapt to the changing 
demands of the design thinking process. Unfinished design spaces encourage continued 
reconfiguration. Conversely, polished, ostensibly complete spaces engender the opposite 
response (p. 7). As the design team transitions from ideation to prototyping, it often leads 
to a reconfiguration of the space to suit new demands and encourage continued 
collaboration. Thus, the ideal design space is modular. 
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E. ACCEPTANCE OF RESULTS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Acceptance of a prototype by affected users, and its implementation by 
stakeholders, is a vital component of the design thinking effort. The long-term success of 
a prototype requires a sustainable implementation plan supported by stakeholders (IDEO, 
2009, p. 127). Implementation plans create incentives and leverage the capabilities of 
different stakeholders to promote the adoption process. 
Continual feedback from stakeholders, potential users, and the project sponsor in 
the design-thinking project helps the design team to prepare the implementation plan and 
determine the viability and feasibility of potential solutions. Implementation requires 
communicating to stakeholders, and potential users, with sufficient clarity to gain 
acceptance of the new idea (Brown, 2009, p. 107). To the extent that the design team 
understands the incentives of potential users, and the stakeholders responsible for 
implementation, it increases the potential to develop acceptable prototypes. Ultimately, 
acceptance and implementation of the results of the design thinking process depends on 
how well the design team understood its users and their needs.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Our review of collaborative problem solving and our experience working in 
embassies around the world have led us to conclude that a design-thinking approach is an 
excellent method to enable interagency collaboration within the USEMB network.4  
A. INITIATION 
1. Key Roles 
• Initiator. We initiated this project with the idea that a design-thinking 
approach to the challenges of the interagency environment may improve 
the problem-solving process of an embassy country team. 
• Sponsor. Navy Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG) sponsored 
this project. The authors presented the design challenge for this project, 
along with a proposed methodology, to a command representative from 
NSWDG. The command representative assessed the project and provided 
funding to facilitate field observation of various interagency efforts. 
NSWDG sponsorship of the project provided legitimacy to the interagency 
community during field observations.  
• Design Team. We acted as the core design team for this project. A more 
detailed description of the design team is available in Section 3.a of this 
chapter.  
Dr. Nancy Roberts provided guidance to the design team drawn 
from her experience with the design thinking process. Additionally, she 
introduced the core design team to design thinking experts at the Stanford 
d.school and IDEO. She was instrumental in identifying and developing 
space on the NPS campus to host design workshops. She also led a design-
thinking workshop of NPS students and faculty to demonstrate the 
process. This initial experience of participating in a design-thinking 
workshop assisted the core design team in facilitating subsequent design 
thinking workshops.  
Anne Gibbon, a fellow at the Stanford d.school, provided frequent 
support to the efforts of the design team. She used her knowledge of 
design thinking and experiences at the d.school to prepare the design team 
for field observation and workshop facilitation. Her assistance to the 
4 Design thinking is an iterative process that builds on the insights and information obtained in each 
preceding cognitive activity. It is difficult to capture the number of iterations of the process that the core 
design team went through in the linear format of static text. 
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project demonstrated the value of having an experienced design thinker 
regularly involved in the design thinking process. 
 
• Stakeholders. Stakeholders in the interagency community are as numerous 
as they are diverse. The stakeholders included in this project were 
ambassadors, senior embassy personnel, senior military officers, 
operational commanders, and fellow students.  
2. Design Brief 
As initiators, we created their own design brief to guide this project. With input 
from the project sponsor, we developed a design brief that would provide focus to the 
project and would likely result in a desirable, feasible, and viable outcome within the 
constraints of the current environment. 
a. Design Challenge 
The design challenge that emerged for this project was the following: how might 
we (the authors) improve the problem solving of embassy USEMB country team? 
b. Constraints 
This project began with several clear constraints. We knew that any change to 
national level interagency manning, authorities or appropriations was beyond the scope of 
the project. Such actions take congressional approval we considered unlikely to occur in 
the time available.  
As with all design projects, time and funding were a clear constraints. We had 
nine months to conduct the design thinking process while satisfying other professional, 
academic, and personal requirements. During this time, a USG shutdown due to 
sequestration in October 2013 delayed travel for field observations for three months, 
which further compressed the timeline for this project. This compressed schedule, and 
limited funding, restricted field observation and confined prototype testing to four 
episodic encounters with potential users.  
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c. Benchmarks 
We identified five project benchmarks to ensure completion in time for 
graduation. Our first benchmark, in August 2013, was a literature review, as well as a 
project proposal. Next, we wrote a paper to distribute to our peers and to senior SOF and 
other agency leaders in October 2013. It provided important feedback and insight into 
various perspectives on interagency collaboration. This provided valuable understanding 
needed before our first design thinking workshop in December 2013. The purpose of this 
workshop was to develop ideas and prototypes to improve interagency collaboration. The 
fourth benchmark was field observation and prototype testing during the first quarter of 
2014.The fifth, and final, benchmark was the submission of this project write-up during 
the second quarter of 2014. 
d. Objectives 
The primary objective of the overall project was to develop desirable, feasible, 
and viable prototype that improves interagency problem solving and decision making. 
We considered a prototype desirable if potential users expressed they wanted to employ 
the process in the future. A feasible prototype addressed the range of problems the 
country team may encounter within the bounds of the aforementioned constraints. 
Finally, the viability of the prototype was a function of whether other units or 
organizations could replicate the process at other embassies. 
3. Design Components 
a. The Design Team 
Each member of the design team brought a unique perspective to the project 
shaped by previous experience working with embassy country teams. We connected with 
various individuals who provided a range of support from regular, direct participation to 
one-time discussions. We continue to receive feedback from this dynamic network of 
stakeholders and users. 
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b. The Design Space 
During the course of this project, NPS developed a dedicated space to support 
design thinking activities (see Figure 6). The NPS design space provided a location for 
the design team to conduct initial design workshops that led to improved understanding 
of the process, new ideas for addressing interagency collaboration, and early prototypes 
to test. 
 
Figure 6.  NPS design space 
While travelling, the core design team used existing office space and traditional 
conference rooms available at participant locations to hold design workshops. The 
authors used available whiteboards and wall space to facilitate the design thinking 




Personal observation during the discovery phase allowed us to observe regular 
and episodic interactions between subgroups within the country team network. It also 
allowed us to assess the impact of interpersonal dynamics on information sharing and 
coordination among the embassy staff. We spoke with current and former members of 
various agencies, all of whom possessed a variety of experiences working as a member of 
a country team. Additionally, our direct observation of the daily lives of the members of 
the country team provided insight into the problem-solving environment. It is possible 
that our presence disrupted the daily routines of those observed. To mitigate this possible 
disruption, we sought to match observations with available open source data written and 
prepared independent of our observations. We document these observations in Chapter 
IV. 
To facilitate our understanding of the country team’s problem solving 
methodology, we compiled observations, information, and experiences into a sociogram 
of the USEMB country team network (see Appendix B). Using social network analysis, 
we analyzed the formal and informal relationships within the country team. Analysis of 
network topology and centrality provided insight regarding the structure of the country 
team essential to understanding its existing problem solving process.  
When possible we facilitated design thinking workshops so participants could go 
through their own design thinking process. In some cases, this required participants to 
gather information and observe applicable environments prior to attending the workshop. 
In other instances, we invited potential users and subject matter experts to share their 
wants, needs and concerns directly with workshop participants as part of the workshop 
session. These shared observations and experiences informed our ideation process. We 
discuss the results of this process in Appendix A. 
1. Practice Design Workshop 
We conducted our first design-thinking workshop in December 2013 with a group 
of 10 students and faculty from NPS, the Defense Language Institute (DLI), and the local 
community. The students and faculty represented current and former members of various 
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agencies with a wide range of experience. This workshop taught us a great deal about 
facilitating design-thinking workshops. We recognized the need for more training and 
experience to facilitate workshops and help multidisciplinary groups empathize with 
users, build on the ideas of others, and rapidly prototype.  
In preparation for the workshop, we developed a design brief centered on the 
challenge of “How might we improve the interagency problem solving and decision 
making process within the embassy network?” We also invited participants to discuss 
their various backgrounds and experience working with country teams.  
Once we assembled the design team, we introduced the design thinking process to 
the participants, and led them through some ice breaking exercises. We then conducted a 
mock interview to demonstrate how to elicit information and develop empathy with 
prospective users. We then had multiple pairs (interviewer and note-taker) speak with 
prospective users and subject matter experts. 
Synthesis of field observations, empathy interviews, and other research, is critical 
to the design thinking process. After the participants shared what they learned, the design 
team developed user point of view (POV) statements. POV statements, when combined 
highlight similarities and inconsistencies between individuals who came from different 
professional backgrounds with a wide-ranging set of experiences. With the point of view 
statement, the designer captures concrete issues related to the design challenge stated at 
the beginning of the workshop. It is the workshop facilitator’s role to make educated 
guesses about those needs, based on the stories and data gathered. 
One way to write a POV Statement is in the form: A [PERSON/GROUP] needs a 
way to [PROBLEM/NEED] because of [INSIGHT]. Similar to a MadLib, the desing 
team replaces bracketed terms with words or phrases that reflect the insight obtained 
during the discovery process. A [PERSON/GROUP] refers to the user of the final design. 
We attempted to incorporate at least five adjectives to describe that person or thing. We 
added enough information to paint a picture of the person to someone who has not met 
him/her. An example of this is “A detail-oriented, reliable, certified accountant, who is 
curious and able to work in teams, as well as collaborative and creative.” The 
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[PROBLEM/NEED] uses a verb, instead of a noun, to define the challenges defined 
during the interviews. Nouns are often already solutions. For instance, contrast “An 
accountant needs a better pencil” with “An accountant needs a better way to capture 
data.” In the first case, the solution is already implied in the problem statement, so there 
is only opportunity for incremental innovation. In the latter frames, there is an 
opportunity to come up with innovative solutions that may go beyond an improved 
pencil. The [INSIGHT] provides a justification for the stated need. The insight often 
comes from connecting the dots between different elements on the empathy map derived 
from the interviews. In order to get a good POV statement, craft more than one and then 
select one that is neither too narrow or broad. For example, a narrow statement would be 
“An accountant needs to get a job at Main Street Bookkeeping” and too broad would be 
“An accountant needs a way to earn a living.” 
These POV statements informed ideation. We split the design team into two 
smaller groups to generate ideas. Each of the groups then presented their ideas to the 
other. The whole group then voted on the ideas developed during ideation to select two 
feasible, viable, and desirable ideas to prototype. We conducted the votes by having each 
individual in the group stick a post it note under the idea that they liked best and thought 
was most feasible and viable to prototype. The spokesman for the group tallied the votes, 
which in this case was done simply by the visual effect of the first group having more 
sticky notes under their idea of developing a better USEMB collaboration space and for 
the second group’s idea of developing a shared interagency wikki-portal for information 
management. Both groups then shifted into prototyping.  
Workshop participants again divided into two groups to develop prototypes of the 
selected ideas. Both groups developed mockups to visualize ways we might improve 
interagency problem solving within the embassy network. Although the mockups do not 
translate well to written text, the highlights that follow provide an overview of how the 
design team attempted to address the design challenge.  
The first prototype was the creation of a virtual space. The intent was to create a 
mockup of a virtual information-sharing site for embassy network stakeholders. The 
subgroup developing the virtual space prototype decided to use an existing platform 
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(www.opensource.gov) as the foundation of the collaborative digital environment. The 
Open Source Center (OSC) collects and analyzes open source information (OSINT) from 
various sources from around the world and produces a variety of OSINT products. 
Furthermore, the OSC utilizes a customizable interface that allows users to select and 
display information deemed relevant. The ability to customize the OSC display allows 
existing embassy information technology support personnel to customize content to meet 
the needs of the country team. 
The group speculated that a virtual space for sharing information among the 
country team would improve communication when used as a centerpiece during 
stakeholder meetings. The inclusion of a dynamic map as the centerpiece of the website 
also would allow various members of the country team to see and share a common 
visualization. This visualization would function as a method of communicating 
information to other members of the embassy network on demand (i.e., information is 
continuously available, and not only during discrete times, such as meetings) and allow 
members to assess and vet information used to inform decisions. 
The second subgroup’s prototype focused on designing a physical space for 
country team collaboration. The intent of this prototype was to create a mockup of a 
physical space where embassy network stakeholders could go to share information and 
obtain access to new information. The space would encourage face-to-face interaction 
and allow stakeholders and country members to socialize away from their traditional 
work area. The subgroup developed a modular design to allow users to reconfigure the 
space for regular meetings, encourage informal socialization, or as needed based on 
situational requirements.  
Once both subgroups had a prototype, the users questioned earlier returned to the 
design space. Each subgroup presented its prototype to the users and solicited feedback. 
The users discussed what they liked about the prototypes and what they wished the 
prototypes would include or address. We then incorporated this feedback and refined the 
prototypes for their anticipated presentation to the country team we planned to visit. 
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2. Field Observations 
We divided our field observations into two trips in order to maximize our limited 
time and funding. Our first trip took us on a whirlwind tour of several organizations 
located in Washington, DC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and 
Tampa, Florida. Each organization we visited deals with interagency collaboration on a 
daily basis. The primary purpose of our visits was to speak with, and observe, people 
regularly engaged in interagency collaborative efforts.  
We observed both formal meetings and daily operations at by spending a day at 
each location. Several similarities emerged. Often, the groups arranged themselves 
according to rank or seniority. A strong sense of mission and purpose existed in both 
organizations. A function of that shared purpose was a willingness to participate in 
collaborative efforts. 
At one location, we were able to take a more active role in the collaborative 
process. We had the participants stand up, move away from the conference table, and 
circle up around a white board. Immediately, the dynamic shifted when we changed the 
hierarchical seating arrangement. The rigidness of the group disappeared and participants 
became more active and interested in the discussion. At that point, even the most junior 
person began to participate in the discussion. Since the group was standing, one of the 
individuals felt comfortable enough to retrieve some key documents from outside the 
room to inform the discussion. She later admitted that she would not have done so had 
the discussion remained around the table. This emphasized the importance of getting 
people up and away from their habitual meeting positions to foster a more interactive 
environment.  
Our observations at Operation Panama Express (PANEX) revealed some 
characteristics of long-standing interagency collaborative success. At PANEX, each 
individual naturally felt able to contribute whether seated at the table or located in an 
office space down the hall. This natural communication stemmed from the early days of 
the organization, which encouraged everyone to drop rank and seniority from their 
assigned organizations and fully commit to the PANEX mission. The group instinctively 
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recognized the importance of creating a collaboration space and was in the process of 
turning one of their larger office rooms into what could describe as a design-space. The 
key insight taken from this organization was that creating a cohesion group and begins 
day one when each individual that joins the group embraces the organizational the 
mission. We briefly discuss PANEX as a model to emulate for interagency collaboration 
in Appendix A.c.4.  
We traveled to the Pacific Command region for the second half of our field 
observations. During this trip, we had the opportunity to observe PACOM Augmentation 
Team (PAT) deployment preparation at Special Operations Center, Pacific Command 
(SOCPAC) headquarters in Camp Smith, Hawaii, and travelled to a USEMB to observe a 
PAT working with a country team.5 
The PAT program is a good example of how an augmentation team from the 
Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) can purposefully influence the country 
team by being able to tap into a broader network. The SOCPAC J35, LTC Ed Croot, 
successfully used design to build an effective PAT in Bangladesh. Prior to arrival in 
Bangladesh, LTC Croot took a month and a half to decipher over 1,000 pages worth of 
national policy guidance and individual agency documents to understand the mandates 
and missions described in each. Additionally, he probed into the objectives and desires of 
all interagency and host nation stakeholders. LTC Croot came to realize that design could 
help develop specific country guidance and objectives from this complexity. Using a 
design approach, he created a prototype, the country page portal, which is now the 
example for all PACOM countries and regional portals. The portal, used as a means to 
gain complete understanding of the environment, captures all the stakeholder objectives, 
and map out the current and future operations tempo (OPTEMPO) so that the PAT can 
constantly assess where its initiatives fit in line with the overall objectives.  
From our field observations, we learned how design thinking balances the desires 
of each stakeholder. A well-planned battle rhythm allows all the stakeholders to lay their 
objectives on the table in advance to set benchmarks. Finally, the unique role of a PAT in 
5 Chapter IV.D provides a brief description of the PAT program. 
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a USEMB allows it to add value to the overall mission. It has a unique capability to blend 
in and cover gaps for other embassy sections that may not have the resources or 
capabilities of the PAT. 
3. In-Country Design Workshop 
After briefly meeting one PAT in country, we invited the team to their hotel 
conference room to get them away from their work environment and into a neutral 
environment that would spur discussion. We were aware they were limited in the 
information they could share due to clearance requirements and the need to maintain 
operations security (OPSEC) in a non-secure location.  
We began the discussion with the design challenge “How might we improve PAT 
team collaboration?” Questions surfaced such as how often the PAT meets, what venues 
they use, and the type of information exchanged. After their discovery phase, we moved 
into ideation. We asked the PAT members to identify ways they could better share 
information with each other. After 20 minutes of brainstorming ideas, several themes 
emerged. One of which related to using social engagements, like sporting events and 
holiday parties, as a means to discuss future initiatives. We narrowed down the scope of 
ideas and chose one to prototype - a social contacts list. This contacts roster identified the 
key country team members that each individual of the PAT meets with on a weekly basis. 
It also included the social activities in which the individuals participated in outside of the 
work environment. This roster could become a turnover item to capitalize on social 
engagement opportunities for PAT members to pitch initiatives to key country team 
counterparts, or receive information from and relay to the PAT team. This idea may not 
seem very innovative after having filled an entire white wall with sticky notes. However, 
it did prompt each PAT team member to think about how he or she needed to take 
advantage of every social interaction opportunity to engage his or her country team 
counterparts and to keep in the loop on all pertinent issues.  
Even though we did not have the time to teach design thinking to the PAT in great 
detail, the workshop successfully introduced the team to a new method for approaching a 
problem common to each of the team members. Of most value, it provided user-based 
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input (human solutions) to the PAT team leader, which generated ideas not otherwise 
available using a traditional course of action analysis approach. This workshop illustrated 
how one facilitator with a basic knowledge of design thinking could introduce and lead 
inexperienced users in the process and develop options on the fly.  
 
4. Sponsor Initiated Workshop 
Towards the close of their project, we took one final opportunity to test out how 
SOF facilitators (our three-person design team) would introduce the design thinking 
process. Our sponsor requested that we could teach the design process to select 
intelligence and operations staff members of the sponsor unit to demonstrate how SOF 
units could use it to improve partnerships. Working with the staff, the authors condensed 
the design challenge down to a single statement: How might we build and improve SOF 
unit partnership opportunities? We designed a two-day design workshop to allow plenty 
of time for discovery and ideation. We opened up the group discovery process to eight 
international SOF peers from our NPS Defense Analysis department, which included 
members of Norwegian, German, Swede and Danish SOF units.  
For the discovery phase, the eight staff members from the sponsor unit and the 
eight members of the internal SOF units were paired up with each other to conduct 
empathy interviews. We provided sample empathy questions and demonstrated how 
empathy interviews flow in order to prepare the pairs for their interviews. Next, the sub-
groups wrote up the common insights they observed from the interviews and shared those 
insights with the larger group. Both sub groups provided feedback to clarify and add to 
the emerging themes. We then led the large group in developing POV statements from 
those overall themes. We explained how the creation of a POV statement enables a 
design team to ideate taking into account inputs from the user. The two sub groups 
developed two separate POVs. We then led an exercise to combine the two POV 
statements to form one POV statement that the large group thought best captured the 
sponsor’s intent: How might we improve interaction activities with coalition partners so 
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that all SOF allies can bring their resources and knowledge to bear on the shared task at 
hand? 
Due to the sensitivity of the specific design challenge, we moved to the workshop 
to a temporary design space in the NPS Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF)for day two of the workshop. As discussed earlier, compartmentalization of 
information is an obstacle to collaboration. The effect of mitigating compartmentalization 
is particularly complicated when specific prohibitions information sharing exists. To 
overcome this, the design team must use a space where the design team can freely share 
and discuss information related to a sensitive design challenge. This is necessary for 
effective ideation in the design thinking process. Working with the sponsor unit 
members, the authors spent the morning refining the POV statement by asking the group 
to brainstorm all the challenges they face when looking to partner with specific allied 
NATO units, as well as list what successful partnership looks like. From that list of 
challenges and successes, the group brainstormed ideas, concepts, and activities that 
would best address those challenges, keeping “the what success looks like” in mind. Two 
main ideas emerged, 1) liaison officer (LNO) importance, and 2) cross-information 
exchange conferences and forums. We asked the group to prototype these ideas into 
tangible concepts for the sponsor to consider. One group redefined what the ideal LNO 
looks like by listing the criteria and qualities that both outgoing (representing the host) 
LNOs and incoming (supporting representative from the partner unit) should possess to 
improve their effectiveness. Group two listed the criteria, agendas, and key topics that an 
annual or semi-annual multi-national cross-tell conference might include. The two groups 
presented their prototypes to each other and shared detailed feedback to refine their 
prototypes. We The authors ended the workshop at the prototype phase since further 
implementation and testing was outside the scope and purpose of what the design team 
could provide. 
Several insights emerged from this workshop. Most critical was the need for the 
design team to speak directly with the sponsor and hear his views of the challenges 
effecting his organization. Listening and observing directly from the lead sponsor would 
cut out any guessing and aid in developing a concise challenge statement from the very 
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beginning. Secondly, finding diversity out of a group of like-minded individuals is tough 
to do. In this case, all were members of the SOF community, which limited our ability to 
elicit diverse insights about the problem they were confronting. Inviting the international 
SOF partners studying at NPS was the best option available for this workshop. Ideally, 
we would have had the opportunity to invite other agencies outside the SOF community 
to get a diverse perspective. Lastly, when working on a tight timeline, the effectiveness of 
a video demonstration would greatly aid in the education of the newcomers to the design 
thinking process. A short video demonstrating how to conduct empathy interviews and a 
video on how to extract themes to move towards prototyping able would have helped 
guide the sponsor unit from phase to phase in the design thinking process. Incorporating 
these insights into future workshops will streamline the process and make them more 
effective.  
C. IDEATION 
Ideation occurred throughout this project. It was a significant component of the 
design thinking workshops conducted with various users and stakeholders. During these 
encounters, we emphasized ideation. We focused our limited time with workshop 
participants to capitalize on their creative thinking to generate ideas on how to facilitate a 
more collaborative USEMB country team network.  
Throughout the course of our travels, we received further confirmation from the 
DOD and DoS senior leaders, as well as our peers, that design thinking would be a 
welcome addition to improving collaborative problem solving with U.S. IA partners in 
embassy country teams. Most of the SOF leaders believed SOF would benefit greatly by 
getting away from linear approaches to problem solving, and anything that could build 
trust with U.S. partners was worth the attempt. Many DOD leaders reiterated the need to 
build trust, noting that the greatest risk to the forward SOF mission remained personal 
conduct issues. One bad act can spoil the mission and the reputation of SOF. These same 
DOD leaders also stressed the importance of reducing competition and redundancy 
between and among interagency organizations attempting to collaborate. Lack of 
transparency between various SOF missions is an issue that requires attention. SOF teams 
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that know and effectively communicate their priorities can improve transparency. Many 
believe redundancy fuels unnecessary competition. In almost each engagement, someone 
said the same thing, “This is particularly timely and relevant.” 
Senior leaders in the DoS are extremely complimentary of SOF and their 
extensive capabilities if utilized properly. Ambassador Yamamoto continually mentioned 
how SOF leaders could serve as close advisers to the ambassador and provide the 
ambassador options. He recommended that SOF teams should add visits to their 
respective regional desks as part of the education process, and he pointed towards the 
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as the model of coordination at multiple 
levels, which should be used across the USSOCOM global network. Ambassador 
Yamamoto also stressed the importance of SOF finding methods to add value to the 
mission of the country as resources become more limited (D. Yamamoto, personal 
communication, January 27, 2014). 
During our thesis research for this project, we found tremendous value in 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary teams within SOF and other organizations. IDEO 
and the Stanford Design School make this a tenant of every project and their successes 
hinge upon this important factor. One command we visited is already utilizing a 
multidisciplinary approach to tackle complex problems. They found and tapped into 
resident experts already working within their command who provided feedback and 
information, leading to non-kinetic approaches to problems. One such expert was an 
anthropologist specializing in the exact region they were working, but this person was 
working another innocuous job at the command. This collaboration would have never 
occurred if this command did not ask the right questions. 
The ability to facilitate ideation is a skill developed through experience. 
Additional experience facilitating the ideation process improved results. As the authors 
gained experience with the ideation process, they were able to guide the process more 
effectively and create an environment in which participants felt free to share large 
numbers of ideas more rapidly.  
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D. PROTOTYPE AND TESTING 
This project is the authors’ prototype for using a design thinking approach to 
assist SOF teams in creating a self-organizing, interdisciplinary, and collaborative 
network capable of solving ambiguous problems. Each member of our multidiscipline 
design team brought a unique perspective to the problem-solving process. As we 
navigated the various design phases over the course of several iterations of the design 
cycle, we developed a model for SOF team employment that enhances interagency 
problem solving and decision-making within the country team environment.  
We tested our various prototypes in two ways. We sought out subject matter 
experts (SME) and included them in workshops to invite their views about the design 
challenges. Their feedback informed the design thinking process and helped us create 
narrative and recommended process for SOF interaction with an embassy country team 
(refer to Section I.A) to distribute to colleagues, potential users, and SME. 
The most productive tests occurred with potential users. These tests involved 
conducting design-thinking workshops with potential users during field observations, 
then soliciting immediate feedback. These tests often exceeded the user’s expectations. 
One of our workshops led the participants to a candid and open interaction we considered 
unlikely during their initial contact with the team. The initial reaction from the workshop 
participants was a mix of hesitant participation and wary caution. Once the participants 
were encouraged to try the process, and realized that the group accepted ideas and 
deferred judgment, the change in the participant’s demeanor was so dramatic it surprised 
the authors.  
Feedback from participants gravitated toward particular aspects of the process. 
They mentioned they particularly liked how the design thinking process resulted in an 
immediately implementable tangible action. They recognized how it may help them 
accomplish their mission and said they would use the technique in the future. They also 
expressed their appreciation of the emphasis on user, not just “expert,” research. That 
being said, their enthusiastic response and immediate realization of how it benefits their 
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mission, indicates that other people in similar situations would benefit from additional 
applied design thinking training and experience. 
This capstone project report is the authors’ prototype. It is the first attempt to 
offer general guidelines to SOF on how to improve collaboration within the country team. 
The following chapters highlight three guidelines for SOF augmentation teams working 
to address complex challenges as part of the country team: understand the country team 
and its context, educate and prepare SOF augmentation teams, and introduce design 
thinking to the country team. SOF augmentation teams can address these guidelines in 
any order; they are not a rigid checklist. 
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IV. GUIDELINE 1: UNDERSTAND THE COUNTRY TEAM AND 
ITS CONTEXT 
Countries establish embassies to foster diplomatic relations with other countries.6 
These diplomatic missions are vital to maintaining a dialogue with partners and 
opponents alike. Each embassy is unique and performs its vital national function with 
varying degrees of success. The design thinking process requires active discovery to 
understand the context and develop empathy with potential users. This chapter describes 
the USEMB country team in Country X7 to illuminate opportunities for SOF 
augmentation teams to introduce and facilitate design thinking to improve collaboration 
within the country team.  
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY TEAM  
1. Participants8 
An assortment of USG agencies and civilian sector organizations send members 
of their organizations to participate in the USEMB. Aside from the DoS, the embassy has 
representation from the DOD, CIA, USAID, FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Voice of America (VoA), 
Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of Commerce (DoC), Department of 
Agriculture (DoA), Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INLE) (U.S. Department of State, 2013a). The various agencies and 
organizations that participate within the inter-organizational USEMB share a common 
purpose and governance. Appendix B. Country Team Topology for a Social Network 
Analysis of the country team. 
6 This overview of the USEMB country team draws on direct observation, personal correspondence, 
and open source information to identify entities and associated relationships that comprised the country 
team. Classification issues and lack of data availability mean this study does not capture every entity. 
Certain descriptions of entities are intentionally vague to avoid establishing relational linkages that could 
undermine ongoing operations or initiatives. As such, this country team overview does not capture 
information regarding the precise number, roles, and experience of specific entities. Instead, it concentrates 
on organizational, rather than interpersonal, relationships. 
7 Country X represents an amalgamation of three USEMB country teams.  
8 See Appendix B, Country Team Topology, for a Social Network Analysis of the country team. 
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2. Purpose  
The shared purpose of all U.S. diplomatic missions is to represent the foreign 
policy interests and policies of the United States. The official role of USEMB is to 
perform political, administrative, economic, public diplomacy, and consular affairs 
functions as the official USG representative organization to a designated state (U.S. 
Department of State, 2013b).  
3. Governance  
Governance is of critical importance within an USEMB. The interrelated facets of 
governance include decision making, creating a problem-solving process, ensuring 
network members’ participation in decision making, and establishing accountability for 
the network’s decisions/actions (Roberts, 2013). Milward and Proven (2006) identify five 
essential network management functions: accountability, legitimacy, conflict mitigation, 
design or structure and commitment (p. 19).  
The Chief of Mission (COM) is the manager of the country team. The COM 
works with the country team to fulfill the five essential network management functions 
Milward and Proven identified. The COM is accountable for everything the country team 
does, or fails to do. The COM can delegate decision-making authority within the country 
team, but cannot abdicate responsibility. Legitimacy is hierarchical within the country 
team. The President of the United States provides unequivocal legitimacy to the COM by 
virtue of the appointment process. The COM maintains this legitimacy with the 
assistance of the members of the country team. The COM establishes mechanisms within 
the country team to resolve conflicts. If a conflict arises that the country team cannot 
resolve, then the COM intervenes with the express purpose of making a decision best 
aligned with objectives of the USG. The COM designs, implements, and updates the 
structure of the country team by managing its members. The COM also oversees the 
commitment of members of the country team to ensure individual organizations 
contribute to the success of the USEMB.  
The COM is responsible for the development and implementation of the 
Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). The ICS codifies the COM vision for the USEMB. It 
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describes COM goals for the diplomatic relationship between the United States and the 
host nation. The intent of the ICS is to “integrate all existing and new country-level 
planning processes and efforts into one single, multi-year, overarching strategy that 
encapsulates U.S. government policy priorities, objectives and the means by which 
diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance and other tools will be used to achieve them” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 191). The Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) is the current 
planning tool and official method to disseminate the ICS to the embassy network (U.S. 
Department of State, 2010, p. 191). The MSP is the “annual strategic plan that outlines 
the intended goals, priority initiatives and performance indicators with targets for the 
country team” (U.S. Department of State, 2007, p. 59).  
4. Leadership 
Leadership is responsible for creating and maintaining the conditions that enable 
country team relationships. Country team leaders have three primary functions: holding 
collective vision, creating and managing relationships, and maintaining collaborative 
processes (Roberts, 2013). There are several leadership roles within the diplomatic 
mission. 
The COM is the ranking USG official and the personal representative of the 
President of the United States to a sovereign state (Dorman, 2005, p. 10). The COM is 
either a career Foreign Service Officer (FSO) or a political appointee. Regardless of 
background, the COM is responsible for all U.S. executive branch employees in the host 
country excluding VoA correspondents and personnel under the authority of an U.S. area 
military commander (22 USC § 3927). The COM fulfills the three primary functions of a 
leader.  
The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) is second-in-charge of the mission and 
responsible for day-to-day operations (U.S. Department of State, 2103b, p. 24). The 
DCM is a career FSO and acts as the Chargé d’affaires (i.e., diplomat in charge of the 
mission) in the absence of the COM. This relationship between the COM and DCM 
means that the DCM similarly fulfills the role of a leader. Specifically, the DCM plays a 
vital leadership role in managing relationships and collaborative processes. The 
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unrivalled authority of the combined offices of the COM and DCM underscore their roles 
as the lead dyad of the USEMB.  
The remainder of the country team consists of the ranking members of each of the 
embassy sections and assigned agencies (see Table 1) (U.S. Department of State, 2103, p. 
25b). The country team oversees the actions of affiliated sections and agencies within the 
host nation to ensure synchronization with the ICS.  
 
Chief of Mission (COM) 
Chargé d’affaires (Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) 
Counselor of Embassy for Commercial Affairs  
Counselor of Embassy for Consular Affairs 
Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs 
Counselor of Embassy for Management Affairs 
Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs  
Counselor of Embassy for Regional Affairs 
Counselor of Embassy for Regional Security  
Agricultural Counselor 
Senior Defense Official (SDO)/Defense Attaché (DATT) 
Military Attaché for Defense Cooperation 
USAID Mission Director  
Department of Justice Representative  
Field Director, Library of Congress  
Table 1.   USEMB country team (key leadership roles) 
The Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) is the senior 
diplomatically accredited DOD officer assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission and the 
principle advisor to the COM for all DOD elements assigned to embassy (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2007). DOD personnel assigned to a diplomatic mission in a 
foreign country under 22 USC § 2321i serve under the direction and supervision of the 
COM (United States Code, 2009), which is distinct from military units under the 
authority of the area military commander.  
Units under the authority of the area military commander do not formally report 
to the country team or the COM. However, the geographic combatant commander (GCC) 
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often coordinates with the COM regarding military operations that may affect the 
political situation in the host country (U.S. Department of State, 2103b, p. 23). As 
Admiral McRaven states in a recent interview with the American Forces Press Service, 
“Special operations forces don’t train with other nations unless the regional combatant 
commander, the ambassador and the country team all give the go-ahead” (Parrish, 2013).  
5. Environment 
Country teams operate in a dynamic environment that demands flexibility and 
adaptation. For example, in Country X, the USEMB’s environment in early 2008 
consisted of numerous factors beyond its direct control that influenced its activities. 
Perceived security, or lack thereof, profoundly altered the political, social, and economic 
environment of the country in the years leading up to 2008. During this period, a 
revolutionary group controlled significant sections of rural territory. At the same time, 
this revolutionary group enjoyed relative freedom of movement in trans-border regions. 
The group used its relative strength in these areas to influence the population, which 
created a social environment in which Country X’s population felt they were reliant on 
U.S. support of their government to prevent a security crisis that would destabilize an 
ailing economy. The stagnation of Country X’s economy, resulting from the tenuous 
security environment that existed during the years preceding 2008, pressured Country X’s 
political leadership to take active measures to grow popular support for the government 
of Country X. This situation illustrates how host nation power brokers and regional 
dynamics influence the country team. 
Geographical and terrain characteristics of a country also affect the USEMB. In 
Country X, rugged, mountainous, jungle reduced the effectiveness of certain methods of 
technical intelligence collection. Vast tracts of harsh wilderness concealed the movement 
and activity of the revolutionary group and inhibited access to certain areas by official 
government representatives. Military actions targeting the revolutionary group along ill-
defined international borders of the region strained diplomatic relations among regional 
governments. The revolutionary group used the geographic advantages of the trans-
border area and the lack of sustained political cooperation between the countries involved 
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to confound government efforts and establish safe havens from which to train, refit, 
reorganize, and stage operations. 
Technological changes during this period influenced the environment of both light 
and dark networks with elements in Country X’s territory. Advancements in information 
communication technology reduced the transactional costs previously associated with 
collaboration and communication. This increasingly allowed geographically dispersed 
groups and elements to communicate and synchronize efforts. Thus, collaboration was 
possible where it previously was not feasible or sustainable. Ultimately, a correlation 
emerged between the level of technological capabilities and the level of understanding of 
the environmental characteristics of Country X. 
6. Key Success Factors 
Country X’s environment in the years preceding 2008 emphasized the need for 
three key success factors: security, resources, and social capital and accountability. 
Security is essential to operating in hostile territory, such as the rural portions of Country 
X. Without security, network members were physically vulnerable. Such a pervasive 
threat made it difficult to function since country team members were unable to focus on 
other tasks and responsibilities. Constant threats also undermine the ability to collaborate. 
In Country X, it was essential to establish local security before attempting any other 
interventions. 
The ability to access resources directly influenced the ability of the country team 
to complete projects in line with its purpose and overcome some of the challenges of a 
harsh environment. Physical resources (e.g., water, food, and shelter) or intangible 
resources (e.g., intelligence or innovative ideas) dampened tensions caused by political, 
social, and economic environmental factors. In Country X, many issues the country team 
encountered resulted from the availability and access to resources by a particular group. 
The country team actively managed resource distribution among member organizations. 
Increased availability of resources often reduced social, political and economic tensions. 
The more limited the number of resources, the more important accountability is to 
any network. The accountability of the government to the population correlated to the 
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level of national political and social tensions. In Country X, the USEMB carefully 
guarded the legitimacy of its government to the population. Ultimately, accountability 
improved the social and political environment in Country X to an extent that facilitated 
success.  
B. COUNTRY TEAM INTERACTIONS 
A combination of competition, credibility, and trust affect the institutional 
processes, loyalties, and behaviors of the country team. As Colonel Rickey Rife (1998) 
explains in Defense Is from Mars, State Is From Venus, deep cultural roots exist within 
each organization based on the charters establishing each organization (p. iii). The DoS 
exists to establish and preserve peace through diplomacy, while the DOD protects the 
nation through the application of military force to fight and win wars. These two 
departments are sometimes at opposite ends of the war and peace spectrum, which 
engenders competition as each organization struggles to remain relevant to national 
policy and grand strategy. Finite budget resources and manpower shortages exacerbate 
levels of competition between organizations. A perception that an agency failed to 
achieve the ends specified in policy, or is irrelevant, threatens that agency’s share of the 
budget. Credibility and trust are essential in this competitive environment. Each 
organization has its own way of preparing its leaders and representatives to operate 
within the country team. Differences in an organization’s preparation and education 
directly affect communication during collaboration. 
1. Locus 
Locus is where the country team “lives,” operates, and has a repository for its 
history. Each agency and organization that assigns representatives to the USEMB 
maintains a headquarters in a different location. The headquarters for most of the 
agencies represented at an USEMB are located in Washington, DC, with the exception of 
the DOD components of the embassy. The distant location of these headquarters is an 
important consideration within any country team, since most of the decision-making 
authority for a particular agency or organization often resides at these geographically 
separated locations. With the exception of the ambassador, very few senior decision 
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makers reside at the country team level. Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) outlines 
policies each agency must follow to achieve national readiness. The Principals And 
Deputies Committees who drive this policy hold a strict routine of meetings and staff 
engagements to discuss and distribute national policy level issues. This cycle can drive 
the country team’s actions.  
At the micro level, loci are structural divides that result from 
compartmentalization, security classification, and the structural design of the chancery. 
The chancery in Country X is massive, and consists of three stories and spanning beyond 
the length and width of a football field. Each section resides behind cyphered doors 
requiring collaborators to pre-plan and arrange all meetings. Another important space in 
the chancery is the bubble. The bubble is a classified and tightly controlled room in 
which the key representatives from each organization meet to disseminate information to 
the group and seek approvals from the ambassador. Formality and hierarchy dictate 
acceptance and seating within the bubble. An invitation into the bubble requires 
credibility with the COM.  
The embassy compound serves as a repository for the history and identity of the 
USEMB. Some embassies display the culture of the host nation as a show of partnership 
and understanding. Other embassies might display tributes to the mission at hand, 
especially if bloodshed has occurred in pursuit of the USG’s interests. All USEMBs 
maintain a proud heritage and allegiance to the U.S. flag, and ensure all buildings are 
well kept as a show of discipline and prosperity. The physical characteristics and confines 
of the embassy compound have a pronounced effect on the culture of the USEMB. 
2. Culture 
Culture is the factor that marks a country team’s unique identity, core values, and 
norms. Every embassy is different in regards to the level of formality, hierarchy, and 
sense of purpose. Most embassies have a very formal dress code with prescribed 
procedures for interacting between sectors. Some sections dress casually depending on 
levels of responsibility or a requirement for manual labor. For example, war-zone 
embassies might relax standards to allow embassy personnel certain comforts and 
 64 
protection for living within a combat zone. All meetings and official business requires the 
upmost formality. Although tensions may exist between organizations, a heated debate, 
or venting, is only permissible behind closed doors. When the COM establishes a shared 
purpose (e.g., rescuing of American hostages or a commitment to disaster response), an 
enormous sense of urgency and passion occurs among the country team. Each agency 
attempts to retain its own unique identity within its own office space as visibly displayed 
by agency logos and insignia. The country team itself possesses little common identity. 
3. Interactions 
Interactions concern how people relate to one another. The environment in 
Country X is permissive enough to allow frequent engagement outside of the embassy 
with the host nation, both military and diplomatic. Most members interact with others 
directly through face-to-face communication to facilitate strong personal relationships, 
which makes it difficult to create and maintain a larger network culture. Email and 
telephone conversations exist to communicate between each agency within the embassy, 
but each organization retains its own network technology system as its primary 
communication medium. Often, agencies ignore these communication systems, or consult 
them only on a weekly basis, which induces some delays in communication. Video 
teleconferences (VTCs) are the most common method for communicating back to 
headquarters or addressing the principles/deputies committees in Washington, DC. The 
country team expends a great deal of effort to preparing for, and host, frequent 
congressional, foreign diplomat, and senior military visits. The country team emphasizes 
the need for agreement on a common key “take-away” or “due out” prior to the visitor’s 
arrival; otherwise, the country team sees the interaction as a wasted opportunity to 
advance initiatives.  
4. Orientation 
Orientation refers to how a network is driven—either by discovery or by results—
to achieve its purpose. The country team is results driven. The USEMB seeks an outcome 
congruent with promoting U.S. national interests or effectively responding to a crisis. 
Parochialism and competition between the agencies hampers discovery. Progress occurs 
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only through agreement on how to approach the problem. Even an initiative as seemingly 
clear-cut as rescuing American hostages or responding to a disaster can fail to draw a 
consensus, due to the various perspectives of each agency. 
5. Leadership 
Leadership relates to how the country team integrates and functions as a whole. 
As mentioned earlier, the COM and the DCM lead the country team. Each organization 
within the country team does not assign personnel its leadership positions equally. For 
example, within an embassy, the senior intelligence officer can be a Senior Intelligence 
Service (SIS)-III (equivalent to an O-9, or three-star Admiral), which is equivalent, or 
just beneath, the rank of the ambassador. However, the FBI Legal Attaché (LEGAT) and 
DEA resident agents in charge (RAC) are often one level beneath, while the senior 
military official is typically an O–6. Sometimes competing organizations misperceive 
individual rank as the level of attention and priority that the respective agency places on 
the position. In embassies outside of the declared theaters of armed conflict, or those 
without a large security cooperation program, the DOD components place a lot of 
responsibility on its mid-level leaders. The DOD will likely continue a trend of assigning 
individuals of higher rank to an USEMB depending on environment and desired 
outcome.  
C. COUNTRY TEAM PERFORMANCE  
Assessing the performance of any network, including a country team is a 
normative decision (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 443). The criteria are subjective and are 
dependent on multiple normative determinations. Suitable criteria depend on the intended 
purpose of the network. The purpose of the country team is to produce outcomes (e.g., 
sustained symbiotic relationship between the United States and a designated state) rather 
than outputs (e.g., successful, yet episodic, operations like targeting a resistance group). 
Therefore, an evaluation of the performance of an USEMB country team requires an 
assessment of how well it achieves its purpose of achieving U.S. policy interests.  
Examination of one USEMB prior to 2008 provides insights into country team 
performance. The year 2008 was an important period for this particular USEMB because 
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during that period, the country team contributed to the successful rescue of American 
hostages from a revolutionary group, after many years of captivity. As part of the rescue 
operation process, the USEMB produced many outputs in the forms of operations 
successfully executed and projects completed. This multi-year effort produced a sense of 
shared purpose within the embassy. This outcome of shared purpose was the result of the 
inter-organizational trust derived from the work of connectors within the network, which 
improved network performance by facilitating increased collaboration. 
The shared purpose and responsibility for rescuing the hostages resulted in 
disparate elements in the embassy working together. Several times during the five-year 
period from 2003 to 2008, the host nation government provided various leads regarding 
the possible location of the hostages to the USEMB. Due to this cooperation, SOF had 
the capacity to surge large elements into Country X to stage a potential rescue operation. 
Each occurrence had a significant effect on the USEMB. The DoS’ political/military 
(Pol/Mil) section would rush to expedite country clearances, the administrative section 
would surge to find housing or vehicles, and DATT would work with the armed forces of 
Country X to deploy the SOF units around the country. During these periods, the 
USEMB worked toward the same goal, that of ensuring the three Americans returned 
with honor. 
1. Outputs 
Output are tangible products and services. One of the most significant outputs of 
the country team was host nation led, U.S. supported operations, which led to the rescue 
of American hostages. During the five years prior to the rescue, the USG provided 
billions of dollars in aid to Country X, and conducted numerous training events. The 
combination of U.S. material and information support fostered a sense of shared purpose 
and responsibility among the USEMB, which enabled collaboration between elements of 
the USG and Country X’s government that ultimately led to the rescue of the hostages.  
Another important output was a measurable reduction of the capacity of the 
revolutionary group. The hostages had provided this group with a leverage point for 
issues dealing with the United States. Following the rescue of the hostages, U.S. and 
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Country X’s forces were able to intensify kinetic operations against the revolutionary 
group. Increased numbers of captured and killed revolutionary group members following 
the rescue of the hostages was a result of the USEMB’s material and technical support to 
the host nation. This intensified campaign brought the revolutionary group to the 
negotiating table. Interrogations of key enemy leaders captured after the operation to 
rescue the hostages revealed a weakened organization.  
2. Outcomes 
Outcomes are a consequence of an output. The numerous successful operations 
the USEMB facilitated led to a successful outcome for the network. These operations 
significantly improved the security situation in Country X. Not only did this 
improvement have immediate impacts on the political, economic, and social 
environment, but it also created ties that supported enduring cooperation between the 
USG and Country X. As of this writing, the revolutionary group is looking to demobilize 
as many as 20,000 fighters as part of their negotiations with the country’s government. 
SOF have continued to strengthen, advise, and assist efforts with the host nation, which 
indirectly strengthened diplomatic ties between the embassy and Country X, and also 
aided in other regional humanitarian efforts. By 2008, cooperation between U.S. SOF and 
Country X’s military units significantly stabilized the security environment. Interagency 
and international collaboration is critical to the success of the USEMB and is a key aspect 
of the country team’s continued success.  
Such collaboration did not occur without remarkable leadership. The ambassador 
to Country X provided the strong leadership necessary to ensure the different agencies set 
aside petty differences and worked together. He routinely brought key leaders together in 
the bubble to share information and intelligence to ensure these agencies maintained 
congruent missions. He personally led many of these meetings, and did not tolerate 
antagonists. This is not to say the process was perfect. As with any team, discontent 
occurred among the stakeholders in the embassy team. The military, intelligence, and law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) had to ensure their agencies had sufficient representation 
and that they had the appropriate authorities to execute their partition of the larger 
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embassy network mission, which often led to perceptions of competition that ignited turf 
battles among agencies. During these divisive periods, the COM played such a crucial 
role in ensuring the country team performed to its maximum potential. 
Although often successful, country teams can benefit from improved 
collaboration to improve resiliency and trust. The outcome described above is the result 
of contextually specific outputs. Resiliency is important to maintaining established 
collaborative relationships as personnel turnover within the network. Trust is important to 
maintain the cooperative relationships that produce tangible results.  
The process of discovery revealed the presence of PAT working with select 
country teams. These teams were the result of deliberate PACOM efforts to improve 
DOD performance by working closely with members of a country team. 
D. PACOM AUGMENTATION TEAMS  
In 2009, PACOM developed a program to improve DOD collaboration with 
country team members and enhance performance. The result was the inception of the 
PAT program. The PAT program expanded upon the former role of the Military Liaison 
Element (MLE) working as part of the country team.  
The PAT program provides the PACOM commander with a continuous presence 
in key locations to provide situational awareness on an array of cultural, political, and 
security issues. Under the current arrangement, the PAT coordinates its activities on a 
day-to-day basis with the director of intelligence and the DATT. This arrangement may 
change as a result of any interagency agreement to regularize the PAT, or if a senior SOF 
leader were added to the embassies permanent manning list (NSDD-38). The PAT 
directly addresses COM priorities and contributes to the accomplishment of country team 
objectives in several ways.  
• The PAT assists the COM in assessing counterterrorism capabilities, 
drawing from PACOM resources and coordinating with law enforcement 
and host nation partners to provide a common operating picture (COP) 
tracking mission CT programs.  
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• The PAT, in conjunction with other agencies, coordinates DOD SOF 
support to U.S. CT activities, as well as support and training of host nation 
SOF.  
• The PAT identifies civil vulnerabilities exploitable by terrorist 
organizations and seeks to mitigate those vulnerabilities.  
• The PAT plans, coordinates, supports, and synchronizes information 
operations executed jointly with host nation counterparts, which 
encompasses countering violent extremism, counter-recruiting, and anti-
violence messages.  
• The PAT provides operational support for ad hoc military missions to the 
country or region providing relief from natural disasters, such as tsunamis 
and earthquakes.  
• The PAT provides assistance in the planning and execution of the country 
teams’ Emergency Action Plan, particularly in the event of an evacuation 
requiring the mobilization of PACOM forces.  
The PAT program is one example of a successful effort to improve DOD and 
country team collaboration. Regularizing the PAT program would create a stronger basis 
for its contribution to the country team, while maintaining flexibility for the future. We 
identified PAT as an important entry point for improving collaboration within the 
USEMB country team. USSOCOM can replicate the success of the PAT program by 
creating, educating, and training similar SOF augmentation teams to work as part of 
country team around the world. Thus, we turn to the issue of how to prepare SOF 
augmentation teams with the knowledge skills and competencies prior to assignment to a 
country team. 
 70 
V. GUIDELINE 2: EDUCATE AND PREPARE SOF 
AUGMENTATION TEAMS 
SOF leaders require preparation before entering and navigating the labyrinth of 
agencies and relationships that comprise a U.S. embassy country team. The United States 
is the world’s preeminent military power chiefly due to a substantial effort to train 
military leaders to tackle the diverse challenges of combat operations. However, this 
emphasis on battlefield effectiveness has unintended consequences. Although the U.S. 
military is adept at instructing leaders to employ innovative technology, tactics, 
procedures, and equipment to counter contemporary threats, it does not sufficiently 
educate those same leaders for the uncertainties of achieving objectives through 
collaborating problem solving with their interagency colleagues.  
Recalling upon some of the challenges to collaboration discussed earlier, the 
authors identified several general principles drawn from both their own experiences and 
suggestions from other USEMB country team experts that would improve the country 
team collaborative problem-solving process. Communication and cultural understanding 
were recurring themes throughout their engagements and have traditionally been the most 
challenging to master in the country team environment. 
A. COMMUNICATION 
Collaboration cannot occur without effective communication. Notably, one of the 
chief obstacles in the standard country team working-group meeting is getting the section 
heads to share meaningful information with such a broadly represented group. Setting 
security clearance and compartmentalization issues aside, the following suggestions are 
ways in which to improve communication. 
1. Know the Stakeholders and Their Incentives 
Issues are often contextually unique and involve a variety of stakeholders. 
Appreciating the roles and responsibilities of various deputies and principles, combined 
with any knowledge of their stance on a particular issue, is crucial to developing trust and 
reliability within the country team. At a lower level, it is vital to pass on only the 
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information that pertains to the agenda of that meeting or discussion. Remember, the 
stakes are different for each stakeholder. For example, the regional security officer (RSO) 
focuses on issues that affect the security of the embassy, while USAID focuses on host 
nation development. 
2. Maintain Positional Flexibility 
SOF leaders must remain ready to step up to, or step down from, a leadership role 
during embassy meetings as necessary. Many country teams collaborate via an 
unstructured tabletop discussion. In this context, many SOF leaders want to take charge. 
However, it may sometimes be best to take a step back and first analyze the situation. 
SOF leaders must remain ready to assume the lead role in the absence of a designated 
lead agency representative or other formal meeting leader. Some groups may even want 
or expect SOF personnel to take the lead. Egos often get in the way of collaboration. A 
SOF leader who takes a humble approach can often reduce negative cultural stereotypes 
of SOF. 
3. Socialize Concepts 
SOF leaders must make an effort to visit all interagency stakeholders in their 
setting and follow-up with them as the situation develops, which is a recurring theme 
after SOF deployments to embassies. Country teams sometimes intentionally 
compartmentalize initiatives for security. Finding a balance between intrusiveness and 
remaining an outsider is crucial when building trust. Similarly, effective SOF leaders take 
the time to out brief their interagency partners at the conclusion of the mission. 
4. Tailor Every Briefing to the Audience 
SOF leaders must be conscious of the audience’s background and time available 
to deliver an appropriately detailed message, which requires the ability to intuitively 
know the audience or gather information beforehand. Briefing the COM will likely 
require little historical background due to the COM’s extensive knowledge of the region 
and continuous attention on the given topic. However, a briefing to a visiting 
congressional delegation (CODEL) or congressional staffer may require significant 
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background. It is frequently best to avoid using PowerPoint slides and to adapt each 
interaction to the level of understanding of the primary audience. 
5. Remain Professional, Likeable, and Approachable 
Some personnel, especially those in agencies with limited customary interaction 
with the military, view DOD personnel as Hollywood caricatures. These individuals often 
view military personnel as an insular, jocular group with a strange language and 
aggressive personalities. However, SOF personnel who remain professional, likeable, and 
approachable dispel hostility resulting from such simplistic stereotypes of military 
personnel.  
B. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING 
Referring back to the “Challenges to Collaboration” section in Chapter II, many 
issues surface due to the diverse dynamics of the country team. The following 
demonstrate some of the cultural fundamentals necessary to overcome the differences 
commonly found within it.  
1. Know the Chief of Mission’s Strategic Guidance 
The COM is the President’s representative to a given country. The current 
Presidential Letter to COM, ICS, and the mission resource requirements (MRR) are 
essential reading prior to arriving at the embassy. Remember, SOF work with the COM, 
on behalf of the GCC. Ambassador Donald Yamamoto succinctly summarized the role of 
SOF working with the country team, “[SOF teams in the embassy] are protectors of the 
flank and supporters of the mission” (D. Yamamoto, personal communication, January 
27, 2014). To support the USEMB mission, SOF personnel must know and understand 
COM’s guidance.  
2. Develop Organizational Knowledge 
Knowing the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of interagency partners in the 
interagency environment is vital to understanding how they fit into the COM’s 
objectives, and ultimately, the national policy objectives. With an understanding of an 
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agency’s mission and local capabilities, natural areas for collaboration become evident 
and can yield opportunity. Something as simple as providing an interagency colleague 
with transportation to an area where a SOF team is advising and assisting host nation 
forces maximizes available resources and can advance the overall U.S. embassy team’s 
effectiveness through shared experience. 
As organizational knowledge increases, so does empathy of interagency 
colleagues. Empathy increases opportunities for collaboration and compromise. Some 
interagency representatives may oppose an initiative for a variety of reasons, but 
escalating the situation or venting within earshot will only erode credibility. If an 
individual blocks an initiative for petty reasons, it is best to step back and re-engage later. 
Taking the time to empathize with interagency colleagues can illuminate reasons for 
reluctance to support particular initiatives. SOF leaders who encounter inter-
organizational friction should seek to understand their colleagues’ perspective and 
rationale before re-engaging. 
3. Learn the Historical Ties within the Embassy Network 
Always remain cognizant of the long-standing ties that agencies maintain with 
each other, with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and with the partner nation, 
which will be unique in each overseas location. Due to recurring SOF personnel turnover 
and short duration tours, history is often forgotten and the host nation counterparts are 
cautious about DOD’s long-term strategy in their country. Knowing who the original 
stakeholders were, and currently are, and how a given initiative developed, will help 
preclude disputes over future partnerships. Some agencies have habitual relationships and 
operations that one SOF initiative could derail with devastating and lasting impacts. 
However, SOF leaders must also learn to recognize why their interagency colleagues say 
“no.” A difference does exist between “no” as the easiest answer and “no” because it is 
upsetting a historical relationship essential to the long-term country strategy. 
4. Compromise Is Essential to Collaboration 
Military action is rarely unilateral. Always have alternative courses of action and 
know when compromise is necessary. Opportunities pass when individuals ignore the 
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possibility of a compromise. Sometimes “no” simply means “not that way” and flexibility 
and additional attempts to find commonality can result in successful collaboration. If the 
first reaction of colleagues is not concurring with a course of action because it was not 
their idea, or their boss is demanding something different, consider a compromise. 
Through compromise, all agencies can achieve their primary objectives.  
5. Perceptions Matter 
The DOD has significantly more resources that other agencies. SOF leaders must 
make every effort to exhaust their own means and resources before seeking outside help. 
Other agencies often view the DOD as a provider and enabler. Some agencies perceive 
the DOD as over-manned and over-resourced. Common knowledge of the DOD budget 
frequently leads to challenges when SOF asks others for support. SOF is often in a 
position to offer internal resources to U.S. partners. Use available resources to support the 
COM’s strategy. Do not use the resources to establish a quid pro quo relationship with 
other agencies.  
6. Define Shared Metrics for Success 
Identifying and defining shared metrics of success for the country team to work 
towards is a challenge due to the diversity of the culture. Broken down into three areas of 
impact (social, process and results) metrics for success become recognizable to everyone, 
no matter if they come from the DOD or the DoS. Since the country team often 
collaborates in working groups, these groups should base their performance on the 
following. (1) Social—did the working group encourage shared generative activities 
between individuals who do not typically interact? (2) Process—did working group 
members come away with a basic understanding of the process or initiative being 
discussed? For instance, if the SOF team leader is trying to introduce design thinking as a 
potential problem-solving process that the country team should adopt, the team leader 
could ask: Does the group understand the art of design thinking? Do they value user 
research, the importance of brainstorming, and the potential of quick prototypes? (3) 
Results—did developed concepts provide measurable benefit? Every working group must 
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strive to provide some measurable benefit. This can be as simple as all participants 
leaving the meeting with a better understanding how they can support the overall mission.  
SOF augmentation teams must prepare for assignment to a country team. The 
specific communications skills and cultural knowledge described above are only part of a 
successful integration into the country team. A SOF augmentation team can provide more 
value to the COM by using its unique capabilities to improve collaboration within the 
country team. One method for SOF augmentation team to improve collaboration is by 
introducing the design thinking process to the other members of the country team.  
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VI. GUIDELINE 3: INTRODUCE DESIGN THINKING TO THE 
COUNTRY TEAM 
A SOF augmentation team with the knowledge, skills, and competencies to 
facilitate the design thinking process add immediate value to the country team. Design 
thinking is a way to improve collaboration within existing manning, appropriations, and 
authorities. The intent is to develop desirable, feasible, and viable ways to address 
complex problems by including as many stakeholders as possible through the design 
thinking process.  
SOF augmentation teams would benefit from learning about the various facets of 
the design thinking process then reinforcing this knowledge with practical experience in 
facilitating the process with an interdisciplinary group. The methodology described in 
Chapter II introduces the design thinking process and provides understanding of how 
aspects of the process relate to each other. However, simply understanding this material, 
without practical experience facilitating a design thinking workshop, is insufficient 
preparation to introduce the design thinking process to the country team.  
A. THE DESIGN TEAM 
The design thinking process within the country team requires the same five key 
roles discussed earlier in Section II.C.1. The roles need not be external to the design 
team, and an individual may fulfill multiple roles within the design thinking process.  
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Figure 7.  Key roles of the design thinking process within the country team 
1. Initiator 
Anyone within the country team can initiate the design thinking process by 
sharing an idea with a sponsor or facilitator within the country team. The COM may 
initiate the design thinking process with a priority challenge requiring immediate 
attention from the country team or a junior FSO may identify an emerging situation that 
requires country team attention. Regardless of the source of a prospective design 
challenge, the initiator shares that information with the sponsor/convener to begin the 
design thinking process. 
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2. Sponsor/Convener 
The design thinking process requires a sponsor/convener with the legitimacy and 
resources necessary to encourage people to act. Introducing new technology or processes 
to a group is typically ineffective without the support of a sponsor to promote its 
acceptance and implementation. The COM, or the Chargé d’affaires, is the clear sponsor 
within the country team. Correspondingly, the DCM is a natural convener for many of the 
challenges a country team faces. Regardless of the reason for supporting the design 
thinking process, the sponsor/convener provides purpose and intent to the process. 
Whether the COM or the DCM, the sponsor/convener provides guidance to the facilitator 
regarding country team priorities and emerging issues to guide design team efforts.  
The COM may elect to support the design thinking process for a variety of 
reasons. Design thinking is useful to the COM when she requires a way to develop a deep 
understanding of an emerging crisis, to engage stakeholders, to transform existing 
knowledge into a practical strategy, or simply to create a more innovative embassy 
environment (IDEO, 2009, p. 17).  
3. Facilitator 
The facilitator leads the design thinking process. The role of the facilitator is vital 
to introducing the design thinking process to the country team. The facilitator uses his 
experience, skill and competency to determine the right opportunity to introduce the 
design thinking process. Certain settings, such as working group, can provide the 
facilitator with such an opportunity.  
On the country team, the DCM could be the facilitator since the DCM often leads 
various working groups within the country team. The facilitator would receive guidance 
from the sponsor/convener to use the design thinking process to develop frequent, low-
fidelity options (prototypes) in response to the design challenge. The facilitator would 
also assist the sponsor in identifying challenges for which the design thinking process is 
appropriate. If the DCM is not comfortable facilitating the design thinking process, then 
an independent facilitator will be necessary.  
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Facilitation is critical during all phases of the design thinking process. Facilitators 
ensure success is measurable and demonstrable. Undertaking the design thinking process 
without a facilitator is unwise and can result in an organization wasting limited resources 
and busying itself with meaningless tasks. To avoid this situation, the facilitator works 
with the sponsor/convener to determine the most appropriate way of tackling the design 
challenge.  
The facilitator also works with the sponsor/convener to develop a clear and 
concise design brief to guide the design team’s efforts. For example, in the midst of a 
crisis, the design team may not have time to conduct intensive field research, and the 
facilitator may modify the process to focus on analyzing existing data to develop 
contextual understanding, rapidly generate ideas, and provide options to the COM 
without extensive testing and refinement. However, if time and resources are less 
limiting, the design team can engage more deeply through field observations, stakeholder 
input, and prototype testing. When the sponsor/convener approves the design brief, the 
facilitator communicates the brief to the core design team and begins the design thinking 
process.  
The facilitator plays a crucial role in assisting the other members of the design 
team, locating space, and identifying opportunities to demonstrate elements of the design 
thinking process. It is important to explain to other members of the country team where 
and how they can contribute to the success of the design thinking process by explaining 
their role within the design team. 
4. Core Design Team 
The design thinking process functions best when a facilitator, and a core group of 
three to eight individuals, guides the process. Ideally, several members of the core design 
team have experience facilitating the design thinking process. This knowledge is useful in 
identifying and recruiting additional participants. A SOF augmentation team with 
knowledge and practical experience with the design thinking process comprises an ideal 
core design team. 
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Active participation is the best way to learn the design thinking process. 
Therefore, once the members of the SOF augmentation team understand the foundational 
tenants of the design thinking process presented Chapter II, they will benefit from 
frequent practical experience participating in, and facilitating, design workshops. The 
more a SOF augmentation team can participate in, and facilitate, design-thinking 
workshops together, the better prepared it will be to support similar workshops with the 
country team.  
Inclusion of the facilitator within the core design team improves the core design 
team’s process fluency and understanding of sponsor/convener guidance. The facilitator 
combines knowledge of the design thinking process with understanding of the sponsor’s 
requirements to guide the larger design team through the process. 
5. Stakeholders and Potential Users 
When possible, the design team includes stakeholders and potential users in 
design thinking process. Their early and frequent inclusion gives them opportunities to 
voice concerns and desires and thus expand the design team’s understanding of a 
particular problem. Additionally, because stakeholders will ultimately implement the 
prototype produced during the design thinking process, their feedback to the design team 
is valuable in assessing the feasibility or viability of prospective prototypes.  
B. THE DESIGN SPACE 
The purpose of a design space is to provide the design team with a location in 
which to work during the design thinking process. Ideally, the design team will have a 
dedicated space to work. However, space is at a premium in many embassies. Often a 
design team will have to earn design space within the embassy by demonstrating value to 
the success of the mission. Until a sponsor/convener recognizes the value of design 
thinking, it is unlikely the design team will have a dedicated design space. Nevertheless, 
ad hoc design space, although not ideal, provides a common space for participants to 
interact, share ideas, and develop prototypes.  
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C. NARRATIVE: SOF AUGMENTATION TEAM USE OF DESIGN 
THINKING TO PREPARE FOR A COUNTRY TEAM ASSIGNMENT 
This fictional narrative provides a glimpse into what right might look like when 
preparing for the complex environment of an embassy country team using design 
thinking. Recall from the narrative that began this project, that the SOF team leader was 
ill-prepared for the assignment to a country team. This narrative describes how a prepared 
SOF leader could apply the previously mentioned guidelines to prepare for and execute 
an assignment to a country team. It is not an all-encompassing checklist. It will provide 
some examples, based on our study and experience, of things to do in preparation for a 
SOF embassy deployment, preparation that the SOF team in the first narrative in Chapter 
I was either unaware of or unable to conduct.  
Prudent planning and preparation is important to maximizing the probability of 
success. For example, if a team only has a couple of weeks advance notice of a pending 
deployment, it is unlikely the team will have time to conduct much additional training. 
The team must therefore rely on the strength and value of prior training. A team that does 
not take the time to train and prepare to operate as part of a country team prior to 
receiving orders to a USEMB is unlikely to develop the requisite knowledge, skills and 
competencies after the fact. This is not to say the team will fail, but it does emphasize the 
importance of preparation in improving the team’s probability of success.  
The following fictional scenario demonstrates the benefits of utilizing design 
thinking to approach a new, complex counter-narcotics (CN) mission to Country A. 
1. Planning 
You are a SOF detachment commander just returned from a DTAAC deployment. 
Your battalion commander (BC) (sponsor) summons you to his office and informs you 
that you (facilitator) will lead a CN mission to Country A. The battalion commander 
informs you that the battalion leadership has no institutional CN expertise regarding 
Country A, but some of the senior non-commissioned officers (NCO) have experience 
working CN missions in neighboring countries. You ask him for additional guidance, but 
he admits he does not know much about the mission. The commander does know the 
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mission is of utmost importance, and the high profile nature has the close interest of the 
group commander and his bosses. Based on the “no fail” nature of the mission, you ask 
permission to personally select team members and possibly support personnel. The 
battalion commander agrees to review your proposed personnel list, but he admits there 
may be a personnel cap (constraint), so you manage your expectations. Although it may 
take some time to get SecDef’s signature on the deployment order (DEPORD), the BC 
asks to hear your proposal in three weeks. When the day started, you were thinking about 
an upcoming vacation and now you are planning one of the most complex missions of 
your career. As you walk back to your team room, you realize this is why you joined 
Special Forces. You are elated with your latest challenge. 
2. Organizing 
Once you are back in your team room, you call in your team sergeant and give 
him a quick dump of the meeting with the BC. You remember your exposure to design 
thinking and you want to get started capturing ideas. You start to make a list of things 
you need to do, and you both immediately start to discuss the team’s composition. At this 
point, you know the strengths and weaknesses of your entire team; you know the 
character and demeanor of some of your team members make them great combat soldiers. 
Conversely, some of these same characteristics might produce a liability in an embassy 
environment. You and the team sergeant create a by-name order of merit list (OML) for 
this mission, knowing you may have to cut a few teammates at the expense of some 
support personnel.  
Next, you and the team sergeant make a list of documents you need to start 
reviewing promptly. These documents will drive the next steps in the discover process. 
You start with the current DOD authorities for Country A (if there are any), and you ask 
the battalion staff for copies of the DEPORD. Your parallel effort is looking for other 
documents of equal importance to the COM, namely the DoS’s Mission Resource 
Request for Country A, the Integrated Country Strategy and the Presidential Letter of 
Instruction for the U.S. ambassador to Country A. These three DoS documents detail the 
priorities of that embassy, and they give you a chance to nest your plan with the 
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ambassador’s plan. Reviewing these documents is a great start, but you soon realize you 
need to sit down with the professionals from all the USG agencies involved. Therefore, 
you organize a list of visits you will need to make in the NCR. 
To synchronize your plan with the ambassador’s, you realize you first need to sit 
down with the Country A regional desk at the DOs. From the DoS, you move to CIA 
headquarters (HQ), and meet with the division responsible for Country A. During the 
course of this meeting, they intimate certain intelligence gaps you can assist with during 
your deployment. After these meetings, DoS and CIA officers send cables to their 
colleagues at the U.S. embassy in Country A to let them know about your visit and to 
assure them that your team is willing to partner in any way you can, which demonstrates 
your team’s willingness to work with partner agencies, and it has a tremendous impact on 
your future operations when you arrive on the ground in the embassy. Based on the CN 
mission nexus, you also reach out to the U.S. LEAs working in Country A. 
The first LEA meeting is with the DEA’s Special Operations Division, which has 
been supporting CN missions in Country A for the last 20 years. You quickly realize 
there is a dearth of CN knowledge and expertise in your own group, as you listen to the 
nuanced accounts of numerous special agents who have been on the ground in Country 
A. You astutely ask the DEA agents if they would be willing to come to your home 
station for a couple of days to instruct your team on the intricacies of drug laboratories 
and other CN tasks. They readily accept, and you work it through the USSOCOM DEA 
LNO in Tampa, FL.  
After you finish with the DEA you meet with the FBI and the U.S. Marshals 
(USMS). You are experienced working with the FBI in Afghanistan, but rapidly realize 
they have a much different role in this mission. However, you discover both agencies 
have deep historical ties with Country A’s federal police force and they provide you with 
points of contact. Although the FBI and USMS are not fixated on CN efforts in Country 
A, they often work with the DEA to apprehend criminals in the drug cartels. 
Additionally, some of the FBI and USMS agents travel to Country A regularly. From 
these experienced agents you learn valuable atmospherics about key leaders in the U.S. 
embassy because of the agent’s daily interactions with these key leaders in the past. 
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Throughout the course of several days of meetings, you learn the DCM is the key 
member of the country team, since she leads numerous working groups on behalf of the 
ambassador, and she possesses extensive regional expertise. However, the DCM has little 
experience in design thinking, so you anticipate that should a design challenge emerge 
you will likely assume the role of the facilitator. These environmentals prove to be as 
important as any other facts you gather during your visit to the NCR.  
Once you have completed gathering facts in the NCR, you travel to the TSOC to 
review your meetings, and you speak with several staff members who have previously 
served in Country A. You also meet with members of the J35 staff who advise you which 
partner nation force you will work with during this mission. They provide you with some 
read ahead material, which you promptly send back to your team to review. While at the 
TSOC you discover there has not been a USSOF team on the ground in Country A for the 
last five years due to combat rotations. You have already learned from your other 
interactions that the previous SOF teams had good reputations in the embassy, but you 
will basically have to start from scratch because of the lengthy gap. Based on this 
knowledge, you reach out to the DATT’s Office and start communicating with the SDO 
in Country A to demonstrate your acknowledgement of his seniority in the embassy, and 
it also lets him know your plan. The SDO appreciates your transparency and promises to 
provide your team his full support. He also provides you with a liaison officer point of 
contact (POC) in his office who can handle your team’s specifics needs. The use of 
design thinking, along with your efforts to expand your collaborative network, is starting 
to pay dividends with your team. 
3. Preparation and Training 
Upon returning to your home station, you and your team develop a pre-
deployment preparation plan. You know that success comes from the interdisciplinary 
nature of your teammates’ experiences, and you bring each of their backgrounds to bear 
in looking at this mission. During the course of your travels, you identify training 
necessary for your team to be successful. You discover while visiting the TSOC that the 
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is teaching a week long Special Operations 
 85 
Forces Interagency Collaboration Course. You sign up select members of your team for 
this course, and then you schedule additional focused military training, which includes 
shooting, defensive driving, and concentrated medical training. Meanwhile, two of your 
team members speak the native language, and they conduct language training to increase 
their proficiency.  
While visiting CIA and DoS, the desk officers recommended some books for the 
team to read prior to deployment. In their opinions, this literature will help the team 
understand the culture and the personalities they will be working with from the partner 
nation. The DEA also offers a reading list, which covers some specific regional CN 
operations and historical vignettes. The SDO and TSOC also provide unclassified reading 
suggestions. You start to be inundated with reading and realize you have not even started 
to look at the classified information. You request and receive an intelligence analyst from 
the Battalion Intelligence Section, and the analyst starts to review classified material and 
build an intelligence briefing. You then start to parse out the unclassified reading to the 
different members of the team to cross-level information efficiently to give you time to 
work on your briefing to the BC. You and your team sergeant then create the final OML 
for the trip, which includes an intelligence analyst and a logistician. You plan to request 
both during the BC’s briefing. 
The briefing to the BC goes well. He says he has already received a phone call 
from his buddy at the TSOC stating they were impressed by the depth and breadth of 
collaboration that occurred across the interagency before and during your visit to the 
TSOC. This collaboration makes the commander happy and sets a good tone for the rest 
of the briefing. The BC approves of your training plan for the partner nation, but he 
received confirmation that a personnel cap, in fact, is in effect for the mission. He 
approves your request for an intelligence analyst and logistician, but directs you to leave 
two team members stateside. As you have already created the OML, you have identified 
two soldiers who can attend career progressing schools while the rest of the team is 
deployed. Once again, your prudent planning has kept the mission on track. Your final 
request for the BC is to conduct a site survey at the embassy. Two days later, the BC 
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informs you the site survey has been approved by higher. You are ready for the next 
phase. 
4. Setting the Stage 
Before your site survey, you remembered the informal advice you received during 
your visits to the NCR about the center of gravity in the embassy resting with the DCM. 
You ensure that your liaison in the Defense Attaché’s Office (DAO) schedules a meeting 
with the DCM during your visit. Your first visit in the embassy is with your liaison in the 
DAO. She also shows you the workspace you will occupy during your mission. It is 
small, but workable, and you are thankful to have a dedicated office. You take 
measurements and pictures so you can design the optimal workspace at home station and 
maximize your collaborative space.  
In the course of the site survey. you meet with the SDO, the DEA RAC, CIA 
officers, DoS officers, the LEGAT, the partner nation force commander, and the DCM. 
All your meetings go as planned before you sit down with the DCM. You learn 
immediately that the gouge you received about the DCM was spot on, and she 
appreciates you providing a formal briefing regarding your team’s mission. She proceeds 
to schedule an afterhours meeting with the COM that day. Based on their previous 
assignments in the region, the COM and DCM do not have much experience with the 
DOD in general, and SOF, in specific. They each have some pointed questions for you 
during the exchange regarding your interaction with the partner nation’s military. Since 
you met with the DoS’s regional desk for Country A, you are prepared for this. You 
know to address their concerns immediately. Consequently, you are able to assuage their 
concerns and address several inaccurate stereotypes. Furthermore, you have rehearsed 
talking points based on the COM’s Mission Resource Request, which addresses ways you 
can add value to the COM’s strategic plan in Country A, which impresses both the COM 
and the DCM, and they both pledge their full support to your team’s mission. After 
leaving the meeting, the DCM tells you to come to her if you have any problems, and she 
says she looks forward to the start of your mission. At the end of each day, you send a 
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SITREP back to your BC and your team. Each SITREP highlights your day’s activities 
and notes recommended changes in your plan based on the day’s interactions.  
When you return to the United States, you finalize your team composition and 
your final equipment list. You have done your homework, so your team OML does not 
change at this point. Since you took pictures and measurements, you are able to rope off 
space in the battalion area and set up a model of your space, which enables you to buy 
specific office equipment to stack radios, store supplies, and reduce clutter. The fact that 
you measured the space intrigues members of the DAO, and it opens the door to expose 
them to the value of design thinking and design space during your deployment. With an 
intelligence analyst and logistician already embedded in the team, your deployment 
proceeds with few issues and you meet each benchmark on time. 
As you start the mission, you begin to observe the team composition to ensure it is 
right for the mission. After two weeks, you notice arguments between the intelligence 
analyst and the logistician, and you realize the friction is in front of members of the DAO 
staff. You remember part of your design thinking training is to readdress the situation and 
the team composition constantly. Since a very helpful and capable logistician is available 
in the DAO, you send your team’s logistician back to home station until it is time to 
redeploy, which ends the office friction and makes more room in your office. The 
mission turns out to be a tremendous success, because the effort to collaborate made 
potential enemies your allies, and you knew where and when to add value to our 
interagency partner’s efforts. 
D. SOF AUGMENTATION TEAM INTRODUCTION OF DESIGN 
THINKING TO THE COUNTRY TEAM 
1. Identifying the Design Challenge 
Once you hit the ground in Country A, you meet with the same key leaders in the 
country team that you did during the site survey, to let them know you are commencing 
operations. You also inform them you will outbrief each of them before your team 
redeploys to the United States. Most of these leaders appreciate hearing about this follow 
up, which they say they rarely receive. The DCM invites you to attend her weekly CN 
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working group. You are hopeful this meeting will provide much needed insight into 
current CN efforts, but you soon realize these meetings do not accomplish much. You 
listen and observe for several weeks before an opportunity to provide meaningful support 
to the COM’s initiatives presents itself. The COM has tasked the DCM with updating the 
mission’s CN strategy for Country A. When the DCM announces this new initiative, a 
collective sigh is heard in the room, and several members of the assembled country team 
roll their eyes. However, you see an opportunity and you quickly volunteer to draft the 
document for the DCM, with the assistance of the other members of the CN working 
group. She jumps on this and seems pleased you have taken ownership of the CN strategy 
document.  
Development of the USEMB CN strategy document provides an opportunity to 
ensure your team can provide support the COM. It also affords your team the opportunity 
to introduce yourself and allocate resources to assist other members of the working 
group. 
2. Discovery 
In the hallway after the meeting, one of your friends pulls you aside and asks you 
to have a cup of coffee with him in the cafeteria. During the talk over coffee, he confides 
he believes the CN strategy document is worthless, and that is why no one in the working 
group volunteered to help with it. Most agencies believe it is worthless and carries little 
value. You remember hearing of another SOF augmentation team who was very 
successful in adding value to a CT strategy document in this manner, so you promise 
your interagency colleague you will ensure the other members of the working group can 
make their position heard if they work with you. You immediately ask for your friend’s 
support, and he grudgingly agrees to help you. You move quickly back to your office to 
gather facts and commence planning. 
You assemble a design team composed of key influential members of the CN 
working group. You ask representatives of the DoS’s Pol/Mil, DEA, FBI, CIA, 
Department of Justice, USMS, and the DAO’s to be a part of your team. These 
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professionals are all deep experts in their field, and they collectively create an 
interdisciplinary team ideal for this task.  
You have already met with your team in your DAO spaces to prepare for your 
first meeting with the CN working group. Once the meeting starts, the excuses are legion 
why producing a CN strategy document is worthless. You listen to a litany of complaints 
and address prevailing concerns. You remind everyone you will be providing weekly 
updates to the DCM on the documents progress, and the group can drive change if you 
work together. As you scan the room, you realize the group has assumed informal 
leadership roles as the more senior members sit at the head of the table. You fear this will 
preclude true collaboration, and you move swiftly to break up this dynamic before the 
first meeting is over.  
3. Ideate 
You decide to get everyone on their feet and up to the whiteboard you dragged 
from your spaces into the meeting room. Once the team members are at the whiteboard, 
you facilitate a brainstorming session. Through word association, you ask for their 
thoughts about this document and how it could provide value to the mission. Quickly, 
you realize that once you get past the rough exteriors, each team member genuinely 
believes a strong CN strategy would benefit the United States and Country A.  
You continue to elicit input from each agency comprising your team, and you all 
realize several areas of concern overlap for each agency. You remember to generate small 
wins and then use the momentum of the small wins to move to creating large-scale 
victories. Therefore, you focus your initial efforts on gaining consensus in several areas 
and the team builds from there. You highlight three areas that seem to cross-agency 
boundaries: sharing intelligence of value in the CN working group, consolidating 
resources in the country team, and working eradication efforts with the partner nation 
forces. This result is great for you, because your SOF augmentation team can assist in all 
three areas. Word is spreading around the embassy that these meetings are not the 
average working group, and your colleagues hear work is being accomplished.  
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The team departs after the first couple of meetings with a more positive attitude, 
and you realize the working group size has grown. It is time to build a new design space. 
You saw this coming and had your unit send you some additional equipment to outfit a 
design space in the embassy without having to use any other agency’s limited resources. 
The working group wants to focus on the three areas stated above, and each agency 
decides it is time to move forward and meet with their partner nation counterparts to gain 
their input and concurrence. At each of the DCM’s weekly CN working group meetings, 
you brief the results of your CN strategy working group, and she is pleased with the 
consensus and progress gained in such a short time. You are excited about the progress, 
but you know you have to continue pushing the group to maintain the momentum. 
4. Prototype 
Throughout the course of the next couple of weeks, the group continues to work 
on strategies for combating elicit narcotics in Country A. In parallel, you are also 
conducting regular updates to your higher HQs and the TSOC on the working group’s 
progress and how your SOF augmentation team’s plan is nested within the COM’s 
Country A CN strategy. Your command is also providing mentorship and guidance as 
you consistently keep them apprised of your progress. One seasoned SOF officer, with 
multiple deployments to Afghanistan, advises you to propose a comprehensive strategy to 
tackle intelligence sharing, resource pooling, and eradication, but he continues to say you 
should scope it down to just one province initially. This recommendation allows you to 
quickly adjust your prototype and constantly make changes if needed. After careful 
consideration, you believe he is right and you pitch this concept at your next working 
group.  
The assembled team of professionals has really started to get behind the group’s 
work, and after some discussion, they agree to focus on one province, if, that is, they can 
get concurrence from the partner nation government. In the ensuing weeks, almost every 
agency gets support from their partner nation counterparts, and you believe it is time to 
present your plan to the DCM. You brief the DCM on this plan, and after several specific 
questions, she approves it. She then tells you to privately brief the Country A CN strategy 
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to the COM with her the next day. The briefing goes well, and the COM personally 
agrees to work to gain the support of Country A’s president. The next day, you brief the 
plan to the DCM’s CN working group, and the COM approves the plan later in the week.  
5. Implementation 
The mission resulted in tremendous success. Although success has many causes, 
your effort to collaborate was no small part. You reduced potential competition with your 
colleagues and you knew where and when to add value to this country team and support 
the mission’s efforts.  
Although this scenario is fictional, we can all draw lessons from the careful 
planning and preparation made by the team. Although no one will ever be able to plan for 
every single contingency, it is important for SOF leaders to understand it is necessary to 




Creative, adaptive, and agile leaders are vital to overcoming the challenges of 
operating in unceasingly complex environments. Military and civilian leaders alike 
recognize the value of innovative thinkers to their organization and proclaim the need for 
a culture of creativity and collaboration. Selection emphasis on adaptation and innovation 
make SOF leaders well suited to fulfill this role. A well-led, multidisciplinary team that 
continually pursues a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the country team, and 
rapidly prototypes methods to cope with those challenges, can immediately improve 
interagency collaboration within existing manning, appropriations, and authorities. SOF 
leaders who adhere to a few simple guidelines are well positioned to facilitate design 
thinking, improve collaboration within the country team, and produce more innovative 
options for the COM. 
Our experience with USEMB country teams, and other interagency environments, 
convinced us of the power of design thinking to build collaborative culture in a 
remarkably short time. SOF augmentation teams, trained and experienced in design 
thinking, can lead this effort. As a cohesive subgroup, a SOF augmentation team is highly 
capable of purposefully building and maintaining the trust within a country team 
necessary to facilitate collaborative problem solving.  
Adhering to the guidelines above can provide a foundation for successful country 
team collaboration. However, this methodology does not guarantee success and is not 
suitable for all problems. It augments, rather than replaces, existing problem solving 
approaches. If a SOF augmentation team does not have the advantage of conducting 
collective pre-mission training or visiting regional desks, it does not mean these teams 
will fail. Conversely, even if a SOF augmentation team adheres to every guideline 
discussed in the project, it may not succeed in accomplishing its objective. Sometimes, 
despite the efforts of the SOF augmentation team, negative influences will preclude 
successful collaboration in a country team.  
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Interagency collaboration challenges are not the DOD’s alone. It is not possible to 
just stop and wait for legislated solutions or grand organizational restructuring to remove 
the blocks and challenges to country team collaboration. In the country team 
environment, each agency has a unique responsibility to collaborate with other agencies, 
but SOF leaders can set the example by demonstrating ways to collaborate with 
interagency colleagues. Collaboration has to start somewhere. Design thinking is a 
natural and neutral methodology to begin that effort. We believe the design thinking 
process is an immediately implementable and promising alternative to improving country 
team collaboration.  
We recommend that SOF augmentation teams gain exposure to design thinking 
prior to assignment to a country team naturally leads to the question, how might SOF 
augmentation teams gain a comprehensive understanding of the design thinking process?  
A. IMPLEMENTATION 
As a design team, we quickly understood that learning about design thinking from 
books was inadequate. We actively sought practical exposure with the process and 
associated techniques. Personal interaction and self-study informed our understanding of 
the design thinking process, but Dr. Nancy Roberts, fellows at the Stanford d.School, and 
partners from the design consultancy, IDEO, mentored us in the design thinking process. 
In total, we dedicated 12 credit hours of our NPS curriculum learning about the process. 
In addition, we traveled to the IDEO offices in Palo Alto, CA five times to meet with 
design thinking experts to discuss this project. Their insights and candor were invaluable 
to our learning. 
We practiced and developed our ability to facilitate the design thinking process by 
holding two design workshops on the NPS campus. Additionally, we applied the design 
thinking to our visits to various organizations at Dam Neck, VA, Fort Bragg, NC, McDill 
AFB, FL and within the NCR. We also used design thinking during our visit to a TSOC 
and USEMB to observe a SOF augmentation team in action. Lastly, we facilitated a 
workshop with the SOF augmentation team to ask how the team might improve its 
collaboration with the other members of the country team.  
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More experimentation using design thinking within the country team will improve 
understanding of its advantages and disadvantages in comparison to other forms of 
interagency cooperation. Ideally, this would involve other SOF augmentation teams.  
We offer one caveat. We are novices facilitating the design thinking process. We 
recognize that not every SOF operator will have the same opportunities we had to prepare 
to operate as part of the country team. It is difficult to ascertain, at this juncture, how 
much advance preparation and experience is necessary for SOF augmentation teams to 
achieve proficiency in facilitating the design thinking process. Developing a program to 
educate and train SOF personnel in the design thinking process requires additional study. 
B. NEXT STEPS 
We are unaware of any standardized program focused on educating and preparing 
military and interagency professionals to facilitate the design thinking process. Private 
firms like IDEO could potentially take on this task, but this would require additional 
resourcing. SOCOM could establish a course in design thinking mandatory for all SOF 
augmentation team members similar in concept to the recent establishment of the SOF 
Interagency Collaboration Course at the JSOU in Tampa, FL. We began to explore these 
ideas during the ideation phase of this project, but determined that developing and 
implementing such a program would require experienced design thinking facilitators that 
do not yet exist within the USSOCOM formation.  
To educate more SOF leaders in design thinking, and improve their ability to 
facilitate the process, SOCOM could establish a Design Thinking Center at NPS. The 
education we received at NPS was essential to building our knowledge, skill, and 
competency in facilitating design thinking workshops. A Design Thinking Center at NPS 
could advance knowledge of the design thinking process and provide design thinking 
workshop facilitation experience to the SOF community at large. However, this presumes 
a solution without fully understanding the context of this challenge. Consequently, as an 
interim next step, follow on design projects at NPS could consider how best to train and 
educate SOF leaders in design thinking.  
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Finally, education in design thinking is valuable to other members of the country 
team. For instance, Ambassador Yamamoto of the Foreign Service Institute recognized 
the value in educating promising diplomats and young ambassadors within the DoS in the 
same problem solving approaches as used by DOD. Introducing design thinking into the 
DoS ambassador education pipeline has much the same value as it does with the SOF 
community.  
The suggestions in this project are only the beginning. We offer more suggestions 
and ideas in Appendix A from which we developed through our own application of the 
design thinking process. Design thinking offers a practical and immediately 
implementable approach to addressing today’s conflicts requiring a more collaborative, 
whole of government, effort. We endorse its introduction to the SOF community and the 
country team. We hope our guidance and suggestions establish the foundation for 
improved country team collaboration. 
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL IDEAS TO IMPROVE COUNTRY 
TEAM COLLABORATION 
During the course of the authors’ field research and personal interactions, 
potential users and leaders at all levels expressed a wide range of ideas for improving 
collaborative problem solving within the country team.9 Synthesis of information 
collected during field observations and feedback from workshop participants indicated 
four broad areas to improve collaborative problem solving capacity. These ideas fell into 
four general groups: communication, cultural understanding, education, and legislation. 
We include them here even though some are beyond existing manning, authorities, and 
appropriations. 
A. COMMUNICATION 
The country team voiced unanimous agreement concerning the need to improve 
communications. Enhanced communication provides better access to useful and varied 
information. To the degree with which the country team has access to more information, 
they have more opportunities to solve complex problems. 
1. Use Standardized Information Communications Technology  
The reasoning behind this idea is that if every member of country team uses a 
standard information communications technology (ICT), or at least, an interoperable 
system, it would reduce technological barriers to communication. Agencies and 
individuals working within the embassy use an array of ICT systems with varying 
degrees of interoperability and compatibility, which creates barriers to communication 
across organizational boundaries. The resulting compartmentalization results in reduced 
information and idea sharing. Consequently, several ideas from members of the 
interagency community centered on selecting one common system, or at least, ensuring 
compatibility among the systems of each separate agency. This idea was not viable 
because this would take a national policy change, and is outside the scope of this project.  
9 Referred to from Chapter III section on Design Thinking Initiation and in the Conclusion as 
additional ideas that we generated using design thinking discovery and ideation. 
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2. Develop a Common Terminology 
If every member of the country team used the same terminology, and ascribed the 
same meaning to organizational activities, it would reduce miscommunication. The use of 
indiscriminate jargon, ambiguous terminology, or polarizing terms to explain initiatives 
and activities, can have significantly affect collaboration. Different individuals may 
ascribe profoundly different meanings to the same term based on experience and 
perspective. For example, the term operation can mean very different things to a military 
officer, an FBI special agent, and to a civilian surgeon. Furthermore, the overuse of 
acronyms can result in confusion that inhibits the sharing of information necessary for 
effective communication. Mitigating the effects of such miscommunication requires 
significant situational awareness and deliberate effort.  
Terminology is a function of organizational culture and can be a significant 
barrier to communication with individuals outside a particular organization, which 
presents a particular problem with civil military relationships. Military culture 
encourages the use of acronyms and jargon to convey information quickly and concisely, 
which works well during military operations. However, its use can lead to 
communications issues when DOD personnel interact with other agencies unfamiliar with 
particular terms and jargon. SOF personnel must make every effort to understand how the 
other members of the country team communicate and follow suit.  
3. Develop a Standard Method for Sharing Information 
The intent of a standard method for sharing information is to reduce 
miscommunication by presenting information in a familiar and understandable format. 
Ubiquitous methods of communicating within one agency often confound and irritate 
other agencies. A general perception is that the DOD overly relies on PowerPoint to 
represent all forms of data. Other agencies unequivocally discourage PowerPoint in favor 
of memoranda, executive summaries, or white papers, which is largely the result of 
agency cultures and the reporting preferences of supervisors.  
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4. Create an External Advisory Element 
This external advisory element, or “Grey Beard” team, would function as an 
emergency consultancy group to facilitate the country team’s collaborative problem 
solving process if other methods fail. This team stems from the Benghazi incident, in 
which many offers of resources and capability went unheeded until it was too late. 
Design thinking could influence the sort of modular and scalable interdisciplinary team.  
A team of qualified and experienced professionals on call could help address 
issues that emerge within a country team and should include retired embassy officials 
(e.g., former ambassadors, SDOs, COS, and LEGATs). The SOF team could contact 
them and explain the particular issue they were having with the interagency partner and 
the advisory team could help to get the country team problem solving process back on 
track. If these experienced professionals’ advice did not work, they could be on call to fly 
to the country and work with the team on the ground. If that did not work, they could also 
make the recommendation to replace members of the SOF team. Unfortunately, as these 
highly capable individuals would have to be hired and then resourced, it falls outside of 
current manning, authorities and authorizations at SOCOM to effect this change. 
B. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING 
Understanding the objectives of other agencies facilitates improved country team 
rapport, trust, and support for various initiatives in country. SOF leaders need to take the 
initiative to understand their environment and seek ways to prevent communication 
breakdowns. For example, too often, DOD leaders attempt to communicate in a directive 
manner that country team colleagues perceive as characteristic of a superior addressing a 
subordinate rather than a discussion among peers. Although military culture values a 
directive style of communication of clearly articulated deadlines and requirements, this 
style of communication can result in significant animosity among country team 
colleagues working with the SOF augmentation team.  
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1. Increase Participation in Interagency Internship Programs 
The NCR has numerous interagency internships with all SOF agencies so that 
individuals could work with an embassy country team. This participation needs must be a 
career enhancing opportunity for SOF leaders, and should empower future leaders with 
interagency knowledge they would not otherwise learn before deploying. These 
respective agencies also will benefit from the gifted, experienced leaders provided to the 
other agencies. This educational advantage of the internship will be reciprocal.  
2. Increase the Number of Foreign Area Officers with SOF Background 
SOCOM also could invest more officers in the foreign area officer (FAO) military 
attaché program to allow SOF leaders a way to fall into an already existing program set 
up to receive, prepare, and deploy military attachés across the globe in support of GCC 
objectives. The FAO branch is always looking for more SOF leaders to join their ranks. 
Additionally, an established program exists to prepare these leaders to represent the DOD 
in USEMB. This would provide the country team with resident, persistent SOF expertise. 
However, this would take key personnel out of the formation of an already over-tasked 
SOCOM, and SOCOM would relinquish control of these individuals to the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. The DIA could task the SOF FAOs with non-SOF missions, and 
thus eliminate the ability of a TSOC or USSOCOM to have responsive SOF personnel 
serving full time in the embassies. 
C. EDUCATION 
Leaders require an education and training before a deployment to work within an 
embassy. Although methods vary, sufficient education likely requires a mix of formal 
instruction and informal experiences with interagency colleagues prior to their arrival in 
the country team. Improved education provides an important foundation to develop 
enhanced collaborative capabilities.  
1. Establish a SOF Education Course 
With the DoS’s leadership interested in improving interagency collaboration with 
the DOD, one recommendation is to establish a SOF education course at the DoS’s 
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Foreign Service Institute (FSI). This course could range from one week to a month. It 
could cover topics, such as area specific briefings, DoS authorities, COM documents, the 
roles of individuals sections in an embassy, visits/briefings by regional desks at the DoS, 
and briefings on the DoS culture to provide DoS leaders with a venue to instruct SOF 
leaders on topics of their choosing. These courses could utilize foreign service instructors 
and allow informal interactions between SOF leaders and career FSO. Additionally, there 
are currently DOD internships available at the DoS, through the Command and General 
Staff College. Budget permitting, SOF needs to ensure it is taking advantage of investing 
in this internship.  
2. Add Additional Courses to Existing Education Programs 
Training SOF leaders for dealing with the interagency environment could vary 
based on the officer’s career path. All officers should have, at a minimum, a block of 
instruction during each service’s intermediate level education (ILE). This block could 
discuss each agency, and how it operates. Anytime U.S. military leaders, of any rank 
interact with interagency partners, the military leaders must be aware of a U.S. partner’s 
optic. Ideally, career military officers could attend advanced civil schooling to study 
foreign policy or to attend a fellowship at some of the key USG agencies. Knowledge of 
other agencies is essential to understanding not only how the agencies work, but also how 
SOF can work with them to support long term U.S. policy objectives. Quite simply, every 
agency in the USG should be working toward this goal. Current fiscal restraints mean 
training and education usually take the first budget cuts, but this is a worthy goal 
nonetheless.  
3. Establish an Interagency Center of Excellence 
Another way to improve interagency education is to create an interagency center 
of excellence in the NCR to allow the top performers of each agency’s mid-level leader 
population to participate in a shared curriculum. Most members of the interagency 
community have a significant presence in the NCR, and a center of excellence would 
expose personnel to members of other agencies at a more junior level.  
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The staff and instructors would be comprised of experienced interagency 
professionals, who could instruct on behalf of their agency to allow agencies to represent 
their own interests. Thus, a DOD instructor is teaching other DOD professionals and 
other agency members are instructing their own personnel. This forum provides every 
agency a platform to educate and address misperceptions regarding it. Arguably, the 
biggest benefit would come from the personal interaction of the mid-level leaders who 
are the students in the courses. Allowing different interagency colleagues to team up on 
projects will greatly increase collaboration for future generations in each agency. Such a 
bold step would take exceptionable support from the leadership of each agency, and it 
would only work if every other USG agency supported this effort with their best 
instructors and students. Outside of a congressional mandate, this course of action is not 
viable. 
4. Imitate Other Interagency Successes 
Our visit to PANEX South Strike Force, an FBI/DEA led counter-drug 
interagency task force, provided insights into effective problem solving. PANEX stands 
out as one of the truly successful interagency collaborations we witnessed within the 
USG. The genesis, and enduring success, of PANEX is the result of informal 
relationships that span organizational seams. These relationships were not mandated, 
legislated, or otherwise, artificially imposed. The network created by the founders of 
PANEX relied on trust established through a combination of hard work and fortuitous 
start-up conditions. A scrupulous devotion to transparency, information sharing, and 
mutual respect resulted in a collaborative team environment that serves as an example for 
other interagency problem-solving efforts. 
PANEX includes members of the FBI, DEA, DHS, the DOD, the Coast Guard, 
JIATF-South, the Attorney General’s Office and the Department of Treasury in the same 
spaces. They do not allow any agency to take individual credit for successes or failures. 
Most importantly, their numbers do not lie and PANEX has been so successful that each 
agency’s leadership provides them unusual latitude to conduct their operations because of 
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their ability to do more with less. In a period of shrinking resources, this accomplishment 
is particularly notable.  
We learned very specific details about how the PANEX team holds each 
agent/analyst accountable for leaving their agency at the door and staying focused on the 
mission. A very important component of this success was that they built this selfless 
climate from the beginning and they used peer pressure to get everyone into “one team, 
one fight” mindset. Each contributing organization’s HQ eventually accepted its efforts at 
the ground level as its successes mounted, which is a critical lesson for SOF when 
looking to start new relationships with U.S. embassy country teams across the globe.  
D. LEGISLATION 
Legislation mandating agencies collaboration is a common proposal for 
improving interagency effectiveness. Mark I. Thompson, Deputy Coordinator for 
Operations, DoS Counterterrorism Bureau, explains that Congress mandated the military 
become joint in the aftermath of the 1980 failed Iran hostage rescue attempt, through the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. However, he does not foresee such legislation as a 
feasible way to compel interagency collaboration (M. Thompson, personal 
communication, January 27, 2014). The political issues, as well as the policy ambiguity 
that many leaders embrace, will not allow statutory efforts to prevail. Consequently, it is 
essential to establish rapport and trusted informal networks across agencies to be 
effective. 
Although interagency legislation is highly unlikely, Congress could force 
agencies to create advisory teams or commissions to improve interagency collaboration. 
Shrinking budgets and resources provide Congress with a great opportunity to study, and 
ultimately, streamline interagency processes. Utilizing the CIA, DoS, FBI, DOD and 
other agency senior executives, working together, to study and recommend approvals for 
improving interagency collaboration could provide the needed impetus to collaborate 
more effectively at the country team level. If the USG does not look at interagency 
collaboration, the country risks agencies becoming more insular as shrinking resources 
force agencies to fight harder to earn credit for their agency’s workload. A Tiger Team or 
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commission comprised of interagency senior executives could provide them buy-in to the 
process and clearly articulate each agency’s interest to the larger group.  
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APPENDIX B. COUNTRY TEAM TOPOLOGY10 
Network topography has a significant effect on the character and extent of 
collaboration within a network. Careful observation of the patterns that exist within a 
system can offer insight into a network’s topography. Networks are complex, 
multidimensional systems connected through human relationships. As such, they form 
dynamic “super organisms” not readily reducible to the study of individual entities 
(Christakis, 2010). When assessing a network to identify opportunities for collaborative 
problem solving, it is important to determine the prevailing network topography. 
Knowledge of a network’s topography also improves understanding of the network’s 
purpose and efficacy.  
The USEMB sociogram (Figure 8) represents a snapshot in time of a country 
team. It is important to recognize network topology is not stagnant. The structural 
positions individuals occupy within a network change over time (Balkundi & Kilduff, 
2006, p. 427). Regular, and repeated, observations of the relationships that comprise a 
network, improve understanding of a network’s evolution. Most importantly, 
understanding the dynamic topography of a network facilitates the discovery of cohesive 
subgroups that are the foundation for collaborative problem solving.  
10 Referred to from Chapter IV, Social Network Analysis.  
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Figure 8.  USEMB sociogram 
A. TIES  
Formal and informal ties connect entities within the USEMB. Sustained social 
relationships form a network regardless of the formality of specific ties among actors. 
Formal ties consist of congressionally mandated or other official relationships (e.g., DOD 
personnel assigned to a diplomatic mission serve under the direction and supervision of 
the COM (United States Code, 2009). Informal ties consist of friendship and other 
sustained unofficial inter-organizational communication (e.g., in 2005, the Public Affairs 
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Officer of the U.S. embassy Tbilisi, Georgia was married to the Political/Economic 
Officer (Dorman, 2005, p. 29). 
The number and strength of ties have a prominent effect on network topology. 
The USEMB sociogram (Figure 8) includes a number of strong and weak ties. Weak ties 
typically span gaps between densely interconnected cliques within a social network. 
Since unity of purpose begins with information sharing, weak ties are vital to 
surmounting obstacles to intergroup collaboration among cohesive subgroups. A sparse 
network provides superior information sharing and dissemination (Burt, 1992, p. 65). For 
this reason, in terms of facilitating collaboration, numerous weak social ties are superior 
to a few strong connections. It is, therefore, necessary to identify the presence, or more 
importantly, the absence of weak ties amongst subgroups. 
The transitivity of an actor’s social ties is another important network topology 
consideration. Transitivity refers to the extent that actors linked to an individual know 
each other. Transitivity can vary significantly within a network as some actors tend to 
introduce and connect their friends and acquaintances, while others tend to keep their 
connections disconnected (Christakis, 2010). Those actors who intentionally associate 
their connections with one another strengthen the cohesiveness of their subgroup. A 
cohesive subgroup is more effective at completing tasks under stressful conditions, but 
less likely to have access to novel or innovative information. 
B. SIZE  
Data availability makes determining the size of the USEMB difficult. This study 
utilized Palantir software and the 2013 USSOCOM ontology to structure data available 
from open sources, personal communication, and participant observation. This case study 
analyzed 75 entities. Of those 75 total entities, 65 are governmental organizations, four 
are law enforcement, four are military, and two are individuals (i.e., COM and DCM) 
treated as small organizations.  
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C. STRUCTURE  
Network structure is the visual arrangement of entities that comprise a network. 
The authority ties of USEMB (Figure 9) indicate a hub and spoke structure. The COM is 
the hub of the diplomatic mission and the country team represents the spokes, which is an 
expected result from a formal, hierarchical structure. The COM holds the purpose of the 
network and the country team sets the style. Examination of the USEMB structure 
indicates the presence of several significant structural holes (e.g., between the Economic 




Figure 9.  USEMB authority network sociogram (authority ties only) 
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Collaborative problem solving requires reliable information channels to enable 
sustained communication. These communication channels rely on brokers and bridging 
connections to join disparate groups and disseminate information. A divided or fractured 
network presents numerous prospects for brokers to establish the vital bridging ties 
indispensable in increasing the density of a network necessary to support collaboration. 
In a network with substantial structural holes, these conduits may, or may not, form 
organically. Whether the uninfluenced process occurs gradually or spontaneously, it is 
largely arbitrary and haphazard and can result in indiscriminate connections that may 
inhibit group collaboration if the broker restricts the flow of resources and information. 
D. COMPONENTS  
A component is an entity or cohesive subgroup completely separated from other 
entities or subgroups in the network. The authors’ approach to data collection for the 
USEMB resulted in a sociogram with a single component (i.e., all entities have at least 
one tie to at least one other entity in the network). However, the removal of the COM, 
DCM and Administrative Office creates several components (Figure 10). The removal of 
these key entities results in 15 components (seven are isolated entities arranged at the left 
of the sociogram in Figure 10), which indicates that the ability of the USEMB to achieve 
its purpose is vulnerable to the incapacitation of the COM and the DCM. This scenario is 
especially true to the degree the network must communicate with each component to 
disseminate resources and information to achieve its purpose. 
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Figure 10.  USEMB sociogram (COM, DCM and Administrative Office 
removed) 
E. CLUSTERS  
The previous analysis of internal boundaries identifiable in the USEMB 
sociogram (Figure 9), compared with the sociogram with the COM, DCM, and 
Administrative Office removed (Figure 10) indicates the presence of several clusters. The 
presence of these clusters indicates the need for further analysis to determine the reasons 
why they are occurring. The clusters appear as small hub-and-spoke sub-networks in 
which the hub is typically the member of the USEMB country team. Speculation suggests 
that the clustering present within the USEMB is the result of a confluence of bureaucratic 
and psychological factors. 
For example, clustering in social networks occurs for a variety of intended and 
unintended reasons such as induction, homophily, or confounding influences (Christakis, 
2010). Induction is the intentional act or process of placing someone into a group 
(Merriam-Webster, 2013). Homophily describes a love of the same to explain the 
tendency of individuals to connect with others who share similar attributes or ascribe to 
the same core beliefs (Retica, 2006). Finally, in some instances, neither induction nor 
homophily adequately explain clustering. In these cases, clustering is the result of some 
otherwise unidentifiable or unexplainable (i.e., confounding) outside factor. Clustering in 
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the USEMB represents an opportunity for increased communication, coordination, and 
collaboration to improve the ability of the network to achieve its purpose. 
F. DENSITY  
Density refers to the “tightness of the weave” of the network (Roberts, 2013). It is 
the relationship between the actual number of connections between nodes compared to 
the total number of possible connections, where the number of total possible connections 
is equal to half the product of the total number of nodes and one less than the total 
number of nodes. Therefore, the country team density equals 170 (i.e., the actual number 
of connections) divided by 2,775 (i.e., the number of total possible connections).  
 170 170 0612 6 1275 74 2775
2
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This simple calculation indicates that the USEMB has a very low density and that 
relatively low likelihood occurs that any single entity will voluntarily collaborate with 
other entities.  
Network density has an effect on the likelihood that individual actors will 
collaborate with other actors (Scholz et al., 2008, p. 395). For example, in two networks 
with the same degree centrality, a highly dense network is less dependent on any one 
actor for information than a network defined by high centrality (see Figure 11). 
 111 
 
Figure 11.  Comparison of a dense (A) and centralized network (B) (from 
Scholz et al., 2008) 
Scholz et al. (2008) demonstrated that “dense relationships reduce enforcement 
costs and associated credibility problems, so actors with greater density of relationships 
are more likely to be involved in collaboration” (p. 396). Note that the dense network (A) 
has no connection with nodes 4, 5 and 6, while the centralized network connects these 
nodes to the core. As such, although the loose network (B) is fragile and experiences 
higher relative transaction costs due to low actor familiarity with each other, it has access 
to more, potentially useful, information (Scholz et al., 2008, p. 396). Existing dense 
networks require little, if any, external intervention to increase collaboration, but have 
limited access to information. Conversely, existing loose networks have access to more 
information, but are comparatively fragile. Therefore, both existing dense networks and 
loose networks can benefit from additional bridging connections. 
Although the structure of a network determines opportunities and constraints, a 
network’s structure is not within the control of any individual (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006, 
p. 422). However, in a network with substantial structural holes, the deliberate 
introduction of brokers can change network dynamics and structure. For example, entities 
seeking to collaborate must intentionally establish ties to span the gaps that exist between 
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groups. In turn, these ties can increase intra-organizational trust and improve the 
resiliency of collaborative networks. Furthermore, intentional brokerage can bypass 
barriers to collaboration and unite disconnected subgroups. However, it is important to 
understand that effective brokers require knowledge of the network as a whole, along 
with sufficient skills and talent to connect, and maintain connections with disconnected 
sub-groups. 
G. CENTRALITY  
The use of social network analysis centrality measures to analyze the embassy 
network is a convenient method of identifying who is central to the network. Centrality 
measures provide an approximate measure of an actor’s social capital based on the 
actor’s position within a network, and provide valuable insight regarding the relative 
importance of entities (Everton, 2012, p. 398). Although there are more than twenty 
algorithms to calculate centrality, the four broad categories of centrality are degree, 
closeness, betweenness and eigenvector (p. 207). Each measure describes specific 
qualities of an actor’s relationships within a network. Using a single centrality measure 
can lead to false conclusions regarding network centrality. An isolated centrality analysis 
does not clearly reveal the strength of social ties within the network, which requires an 
aggregation of centrality measures in combination with an analysis of the network 
structure. This multi-modal approach assists in characterizing a network’s topology. 
Degree centrality measures an actor’s exposure to the network by counting the 
number of ties the actor has with other entities. High degree centrality indicates that an 
actor is correspondingly active within the network and has significant opportunity to 
communicate with other actors. A degree centrality analysis (Figure 12) indicates that the 
COM, DCM, Administrative Office and Military Group are the most active members of 
the USEMB country team and communicate with the most organizational entities. 
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Figure 12.  Degree centrality including COM/DCM (left) and excluding 
COM/DCM (right) 
Closeness centrality calculates how close (on average) each actor is to the other 
actors in a network. High closeness centrality corresponds with an actor’s ability to 
disseminate information throughout the network rapidly (Cunningham, 2013). A 
closeness centrality analysis in Palantir (Figure 13) indicates the apparent value of the 
relationships the Administrative Office and Military Group in rapidly diffusing 
information within the USEMB.  
  
Figure 13.  Closeness centrality including COM/DCM (left) and excluding 
COM/DCM (right) 
Betweenness centrality gauges the extent to which each actor lies on the shortest 
path between all other actors in a network. High betweenness centrality relates to an 
actor’s potential to act as an intermediary or broker (Cunningham, 2013). A betweenness 
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centrality analysis in Palantir (Figure 14) indicates the high brokerage potential of the 
country team. The entities with the highest brokerage potential are all members of the 
country team likely due to intentional network design to establish the members of the 
country team in positions to control the flow of resources within the USEMB. 
  
Figure 14.  Betweenness centrality including COM/DCM (left) and excluding 
COM/DCM (right) 
Eigenvector centrality is similar to degree centrality in that it counts the number 
of ties an actor has with other entities. It is in essence “borrowed” centrality (Balkundi & 
Kilduff, 2006, p. 433). However, unlike degree centrality, it weights links to centralized 
actors higher than peripheral ties. Eigenvector centrality assumes that direct ties to highly 
centralized actors are more influential than the same ties to peripheral actors 
(Cunningham, 2013). A high eigenvector centrality indicates that an actor has ties to 
more influential entities within the network. Disregarding the obvious eigenvector 
centrality of a COM in direct communication with the President of the United States and 
the host nation’s head of state, an eigenvector centrality analysis in Palantir (Figure 15) 
indicates that the Administrative Office and Military Group have the most influential 
connections. In other words, support of the Administrative Office and the Military Group 
improves the likelihood of initiatives to succeed within the USEMB. 
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Figure 15.  Eigenvector centrality including COM/DCM (left) and excluding 
COM/DCM (right) 
Centrality analysis indicates that a high degree of centralization exists in the 
USEMB with the COM and DCM. This centralization is characteristic of an organization 
with one clear authority and an established hierarchical chain-of-command. In the 
absence of the COM, the DCM acts as the central authority. Informal ties may increase 
the influence of other entities (e.g., the Administrative Office and Military Group), but 
COM authority supersedes their influence for the network as a whole. Thus, if the COM 
does not support, actively or passively, the organization sponsoring innovation within the 
USEMB, that initiative is unlikely to succeed. In many embassies, the COM delegates 
authority for day-to-day activities of the mission and certain diplomatic activities to the 
DCM. Consequently, the DCM often shares the centrality of the COM. 
H. NETWORK OPENNESS  
The USEMB is open in the sense that it actively seeks to interact with entities 
outside of the network. On the other hand, it is a closed network in the sense that only 
carefully vetted organizations can participate. A cursory consideration of the USEMB’s 
openness indicates that it is open to outside input, information, and resources that assist 
the network in achieving its purpose. Numerous connections to entities and organizations 
outside the official structure of the embassy assist the USEMB in achieving its purpose. 
Additionally, network members seek additional relationships with entities external to the 
network to establish new sources of information, resources, and influence. Several 
clusters within the USEMB (e.g., Public Affairs, Peace Corps and Regional Security 
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Office) routinely disseminate or obtain information from outside the formal authority ties 
of the USEMB.  
I. NETWORK DESIGN FACTORS 
Network design factors represent a balance of formality and informality. This 
balance comes from the location of network elements on the spectrums between anarchic 
networks and organized networks, unbounded and bounded membership, heterarchy and 
hierarchy, and shared and centralized governance. Based on our subjective assessment, 
the USEMB occupies the formal side of the network design continuum (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16.  USEMB location on the network design continuum 
Knowledge of the USEMB design factors is important in determining the level of 
tension in a network. Tension occurs when the force exerted by one end of this 
continuum conflicts with the forces exerted at the other end of the continuum. Every 
network must balance design tensions. Emphasizing one element (e.g., heterarchy) comes 
at the cost of another (e.g., efficiency). The influence of design tensions on a network 
depends on how well the network achieves its purpose. If the network achieves its 
purpose, and the network tensions are in equilibrium, then the network will continue to 
function well. However, if either factor changes, either the network will fail to achieve its 
purpose or it will not sustain action over time. Widely dispersed locations of certain 
network elements on the design continuum would indicate a design mismatch. Such a 
mismatch would require intervention to bring the elements into congruence. Effective and 
enduring networks find a balance between design tensions that facilitates achievement of 
the network’s purpose. 
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